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ABSTRACT 
 
Capital structure and corporate governance are the important areas that represent salient 
part of corporate finance research. By studying various aspects of the two areas, this study 
attempts to deepen our understanding of the two. First, this study provides both a theoretical 
model and empirical evidence on the interaction between capital structure and managerial 
incentive compensation (one of key measures of corporate governance). Researchers 
acknowledge that the two interact to each other and the interaction should affect their optimal 
determination, but few studies formally consider the interaction. This study shows that due to 
the interaction through agency conflicts, key firm characteristics that represent agency costs 
affect leverage and managerial incentive compensation in opposite directions. After controlling 
for the opposite interactions, the two are shown to be positively related. Second, this study 
provides empirical evidence on the interaction between financial structure and product market 
performance by examining business group affiliated firms. The firms that are affiliated to a 
business group is not only affected by their own financial position, but also affected by the 
position of business groups which the firms belong to. The empirical investigation suggests that 
affiliated firms lose market shares to their rivals in their product market when their business 
group is financially weak due to high group leverage. Third, this study examines whether 
special governance structure of business groups is actually beneficial to the groups’ member 
firms. The study exploit unique dataset of firms that were once stand alone, but later acquired 
by business groups. The empirical methodology we employ can account for the fact that the 
firms which are acquired by business groups can be very different from other firms which are 
not acquired. The findings from matching estimator suggest that performance increase of the 
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acquired firms is significantly greater than the performance of matched stand alone firms, 
implying that business groups are actually helping their affiliated firms to perform better than 
stand alone firms. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Since Modiglian and Miller (1958), researchers devoted much effort in studying capital 
structure of a firm. Even though M&M’s irrelevance theory provides a good insight in 
understanding capital structure, it is widely accepted that capital structure can greatly alter firm 
value in the presence of frictions. Hence, capital structure is now regarded as being determined 
by various factors such as taxes, bankruptcy costs and agency conflicts. Many studies have been 
developed on how capital structure is optimally determined. Despite the development of the 
literature, the literature focusing on the factors of agency conflicts have not suggested useful 
quantitative applications about the effects from the factors. On the other hand, capital structure 
has great influence over various firm policies including product market strategy, investment and 
corporate governance. 
The reason that capital structure is affected by agency conflicts is that there arise conflicts 
of interest between stockholders and debt holders. However, these two groups are not only stake 
holders of a firm. There are a manager, employees, suppliers, customers and others. Even in the 
group of stockholders, there are conflicts of interests between major and minor stockholders. 
Since a firm is represented by interests of various stake holders, corporate governance has been a 
key topic of active discussions. Especially, conflicts of interests between stockholders and debt 
holders and between stockholders and a manager have received a lot of attentions from both 
academia and practices. Again, corporate governance also has great influence over various firm 
policies including capital structure. 
2 
 
In chapter 1, I set forth a dynamic model in which capital structure and managerial 
compensation are jointly determined and interact. In the presence of frictions, both manager–
stockholder and stockholder–bondholder conflicts affect investment decisions and, hence, firm 
value. Rational stockholders set financial policies and managerial compensation simultaneously, 
to minimize the distortion caused by these conflicts. This joint optimization creates a tradeoff 
between leverage and managerial incentive compensation. I incorporate this idea into a real 
option framework where not only investment and leverage, but also managerial incentive 
compensation are endogenously determined. The resulting model predicts that due to the tradeoff 
between optimal leverage and managerial incentive compensation, key determinants which are 
firm characteristics representing agency costs, should move managerial compensation and 
leverage in opposite directions. Specifically, the model predicts that investment, profitability, 
market-to-book, and depreciation rate each have a negative effect on optimal leverage and a 
positive effect on optimal managerial incentive compensation. Firm size is predicted to have a 
positive effect on leverage, and a negative effect on managerial incentive compensation. I also 
report empirical evidence strongly supporting the model’s predictions by estimating 
simultaneous equations of market leverage and pay–performance sensitivity. When market 
leverage and pay–performance sensitivity are simultaneously estimated after controlling for the 
tradeoff by including the key determinants suggested by the model, the relation between market 
leverage and pay–performance sensitivity is positive. 
In chapter 2, I investigate the effect of financial structure on product market performance 
by examining internal capital markets of Korean business groups. Leverage of a business group 
has exogenous variation which is not associated with product market performance of an affiliated 
firm of the group. I find that high leverage of a business group causes affiliated firms to lose 
market share to industry rivals. The result supports the hypothesis that debt induces a firm to 
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choose less aggressive strategy in its product market. Since core firms are likely to have greater 
impact on the determination of group leverage, I investigate the effect of group leverage on sub-
samples of non-core firms. The sub-samples exclude core affiliated firms and the firms which are 
in the same industry as the core firms. I still find the negative effect of group leverage on 
affiliated firms’ performance. The main result is robust to different definitions of group leverage. 
I attempt to uncover the actual channel through which change in financial strength of a business 
group affects product market performance of affiliated firms. Besides the direct channel from 
financial leverage to strategic decisions, the negative effect of group leverage can also be 
explained by resource reallocation in the internal capital market and dividends from cross 
shareholding. First, I show that group leverage decreases investment of affiliated firms. This 
result support the hypothesis that high debt burden of affiliated firms decreases internal resources 
available to the firms. Second, I show that cross-holdee leverage significantly hurts product 
market performance of cross-holders, suggesting that high leverage of cross-holdee significantly 
hurt performance of cross-holders by decreasing cash payable as dividends which is an important 
source of cash flows. By showing that leverage of cross-holders does not have impact on cross-
holdees, I cast doubt on the hypothesis that the effect of cross-holdee leverage is driven by 
factors which determine cross-holding in the first place. 
In chapter 3, I and my co-author attempt to study whether business groups are actually 
beneficial to their affiliated firms in helping them to perform well. Business group has actively 
studied by researchers in corporate governance due to its special ownership (governance) 
structure. This study exploits unique dataset which includes firms which were previously stand-
alone, but later acquired by business groups. We examine whether the performance of those 
firms improves after being acquired by the groups. We find a strong evidence of performance 
improvement after acquisition from simple dummy regressions. However, the results from OLS 
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may be biased in the presence of endogeneity since those acquired firms could have been chosen 
for better performance or other reasons. If they were carefully selected, after-acquisition 
performance can be mere reflection of the selection, not of the business group effects. To resolve 
this problem, we match stand alone firms which are similar to acquired firms based on firm 
characteristics, industry and years before acquisition. The matching estimator still supports the 
hypothesis that business groups help their affiliated firms to perform better than stand alone 
firms.  
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CHAPTER 2 
JOINT DETERMINATION OF LEVERAGE AND MANAGERIAL 
INCENTIVE COMPENSATION: THEORY AND EVIDENCE 
 
2.1. Introduction 
Theoretical studies on optimal capital structure presume that manager’s interest is 
perfectly aligned with stockholders, but there exist manager-stockholder conflicts. Due to the 
conflicts, stockholders would retain incentive compensation as a part of executive compensation 
package. Also, theories on managerial incentive compensation are often abstract away from 
capital structure and stockholder-bondholder conflicts. On the other hand, some empirical studies 
attempt to recognize that capital structure and managerial incentive compensation should have 
impact on each other, but the recognition is limited to including one as simply one of many 
determinants of the other1. However, without considering the two together, the picture of what 
determines optimal leverage and managerial incentive compensation is far from complete, since 
the two are interdependent. Surprisingly, no study has formally considered what factors should 
jointly determine the two in a unified framework. By connecting these two literatures, this paper 
attempts to uncover how leverage and managerial incentive compensation are optimally 
determined through mutual interaction. The model is parsimonious enough to generate 
empirically testable predictions which link key firm characteristics to optimal choices of leverage 
and managerial incentive compensation. The predictions strongly hold for the large sample of 
                                                            
1 Lewellen et al. (1987), Matsunaga (1995), Mehran (1995), Yermack (1995), Bryan et al. (2000), Ittner et al. (2003)
, Ortiz-Molina (2007), Friend and Lang (1988), and Berger, Ofek and Yermack (1997). 
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U.S. firms. Moreover, the model generates, for optimal leverage and managerial incentive 
compensation, the numerical solution values that are not far from what we actually observe in the 
data. 
This paper embeds a manager-stockholder conflict into a dynamic debt-overhang 
framework. The manager-stockholder conflict is shaped by managerial incentive compensation. 
By combining these two agency conflicts in one model, the resulting model has three parties who 
have separate objective functions which they want to maximize. Each objective function cannot 
be maximized independently from others since they are interlinked. The manager chooses 
optimal investment which maximizes her objective function, but the value of the function is 
determined by leverage and managerial incentive compensation which are set by equity holders. 
The equity holders choose optimal leverage and managerial incentive compensation to maximize 
the ex ante equity value, but the value is, in turn, affected by the manger’s investment choices 
and the price of debt. The debt is priced by debt holders anticipating investment distortion whose 
size depends on manager’s investment choice that is greatly influenced by leverage and 
managerial incentive compensation. The value of debt is also altered by default time which is 
chosen by equity holders. Key parameters which are investment, leverage and managerial 
incentive compensation are all endogenously determined in the model and investment decision is 
dynamic. Thus, I solve the model numerically and the numerical solutions illustrate what firm 
characteristics should simultaneously determine optimal leverage and managerial incentive 
compensation.   
This paper develops the first model which investigates how leverage and managerial 
incentive compensation are jointly determined to minimize the costs of both manager–
stockholder and stockholder–bondholder conflicts. Since leverage and managerial incentive 
compensation are determined simultaneously to minimize agency conflicts, the two are 
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determined by the same factors, i.e., firm characteristics that decide the degree of agency 
conflicts. Moreover, the model shows that there is a tradeoff between leverage and managerial 
incentive compensation. Because of this tradeoff, the key firm characteristics representing 
agency conflicts affect leverage and managerial incentive compensation in opposite directions. 
These predictions are uniquely generated from the model in this paper since most of existing 
theories study leverage and managerial incentive compensation separately. The predictions are 
confirmed by empirical evidence in this paper. 
To understand a basic economic intuition behind the main predictions of the model, 
consider a levered firm where the incumbent manager derives private benefits from investment. 
Managerial incentive compensation greatly alleviates manager–stockholder conflicts by aligning 
the manager’s interests with those of stockholders. As shown in Grossman and Hart (1982) and 
Jensen (1986), leverage can also help to mitigate such conflict (i.e. overinvestment problem). 
However, the model suggests that the additional benefit from leverage is not significant when 
managerial incentive compensation is sufficiently high and leverage alone cannot entirely 
eliminate severe overinvestment. On the other hand, leverage causes underinvestment (debt-
overhang) and high managerial incentive compensation aggravates stockholder-bondholder 
conflicts caused by leverage. As Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue, the extent to which a 
manager acts opportunistically in the interest of stockholders to maximize shareholder value 
depends on their equity-based incentives. Underinvestment becomes more severe when 
manager’s interests are better aligned with those of stockholders. When both leverage and 
managerial incentive compensation are high, the underinvestment cost overwhelms the benefit of 
alleviating manager-stockholder conflict. Due to this tradeoff, stockholders would not want both 
leverage and managerial incentive compensation to be high. Which one is chosen depends on 
relative costs of under-and overinvestment costs of a firm. 
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The firm characteristics that represent agency costs in the model are: investment, firm 
size, profitability, market-to-book, and depreciation rate. To investment-intensive firms, 
underinvestment is more costly and, hence, would want to keep low leverage. Since mangers of 
these firms still have incentive to overinvest, the firms would want to employ high managerial 
incentive compensation in order to mitigate manager-stockholder conflict. The same explanation 
applies to depreciation rate. High depreciation rate means that a firm needs to make high 
investment every period to keep its optimal level of production capital. The model shows that 
small firms face more serious overinvestment problem than large firms due to decreasing return 
to scale of the production function since only non-negative NPV projects are considered. This is 
interpreted that small firms have more manager’s discretion. Thus, small firms employ strong 
managerial incentive compensation, but choose low leverage to minimize underinvestment. On 
the other hand, large firms would be better off with high leverage since overinvestment is not 
severe and tax advantages dominates underinvestment costs if managerial incentive 
compensation is minimized. Highly profitable firms also confront severe overinvestment 
problem since these firms are likely to have a lot of free cash flow in the firm which can be 
exploited by their managers. Using the same argument for the firm size, highly profitable firms 
would want to have high managerial incentive compensation, but low leverage.  
This paper contributes to the literature on what determines managerial incentive 
compensation by conferring a new and unified theory and by providing a reconciliation of 
empirical evidence on low pay performance sensitivity. There are many empirical studies on the 
determinants of managerial compensation, and many intuitive explanations are put forward to 
explain the determinants. However, theoretical considerations are limited.2 Similar to this study, 
John and John (1993) employ a stockholder-bondholder conflicts framework which is often used 
                                                            
2 Berle and Means (1932) and Jensen and Meckling (1976). 
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to analyze optimal capital structure, but their study is limited to one direction effect from 
leverage to managerial incentive compensation. Thus, I propose a new theory based on joint 
determination of managerial incentive and leverage which recognizes the mutual interaction 
between the two. This new theory generates the numerical solutions for optimal managerial 
incentive compensation whose values are very much far from 1 (perfect alignment of interests 
between principal and agent). The low pay performance sensitivity that we observe in the data 
can be explained, to some extent, by the joint optimization which takes into account both agency 
conflicts. Finally, the theory not only accounts for existing determinants but also suggests that 
depreciation can be an important determinant of managerial incentive compensation. 
This paper also contributes to the literature on the determinants of leverage by providing 
a unified framework that directly accounts for most of key determinants of leverage, along with 
the interaction between capital structure and managerial compensation. While the main elements 
of the model are already analyzed in the literature, the interaction between capital structure and 
managerial incentive is a new contribution from this model. The empirical facts about leverage 
are well known, but the exact mechanism that drives the effects from key determinants is 
difficult to identify. This is attributable to the fact that many empirical studies are aimed at 
testing a particular theory—such as tradeoff, pecking order, and market timing. These theories 
typically explain only one or two determinants. In particular, no established theory can account 
for the firm size effect, even though many intuitive explanations are suggested. In my model, the 
joint determination of leverage and managerial incentive compensation and the tradeoff between 
them can generate the positive effect of firm size on leverage as described above. Additionally, 
the effect of profitability and depreciation on leverage can also be explained via joint 
optimization as well. 
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Finally, the empirical tests provided in this paper contribute to the literature by providing 
evidence on joint optimization of leverage and pay–performance sensitivity. No existing work 
examines the determinants of capital structure and managerial compensation while taking into 
account the simultaneity of these decisions. Consistent with the model’s predictions, empirical 
results show that the two are determined by same firm characteristics that represent the size of 
agency cost of a firm and the effects from the characteristics are opposite on the two because of 
the tradeoff between the two. Additionally, the relationship between leverage and pay–
performance sensitivity is positive when they are estimated simultaneously after controlling for 
the tradeoff between them. This result comprises two opposing arguments on the relationship 
between leverage and managerial incentive compensation. The negative relation is captured by 
the opposite effects of key determinants. Leverage and managerial incentive compensation have 
positive impact on each other when they are estimated simultaneously and the opposite effects of 
key determinants are controlled. 
I begin by developing a real option model of the firm where both leverage and 
managerial compensation affect not only taxes and costs of financial distress, but also firm 
investment policy and there is an empire building manager. In this environment, I analyze how 
the initial choice of capital structure and managerial incentive compensation, made ex ante by 
equity holders, are optimally determined simultaneously. This analysis generates several 
predictions on the effects of key determinants. It is noteworthy that the tradeoff between leverage 
and managerial incentive described above manifests in the effects of key determinants. 
Specifically, key determinants move optimal leverage and managerial incentive compensation in 
opposite directions. On the other hand, the private benefit enjoyed by a manager from an 
investment affects both leverage and managerial incentive compensation in the same direction. 
First, the model predicts negative effects from profitability, market-to-book, and depreciation on 
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leverage, and a positive effect from firm size on leverage. These are consistent with the existing 
empirical evidence.3 Second, the model generates a negative relationship between investment 
and leverage. This negative relationship is taken as evidence of debt overhang in some studies 
(Lang, Ofek, and Stulz (1997) and Hennessy (2004)). However, I show that this relationship is 
not derived from underinvestment (debt overhang), but rather from the joint optimization of 
leverage and managerial incentive. Additionally, the model generates predictions on the 
determinants of managerial incentive compensation. First, the model predicts a negative effect 
from firm size and a positive effect from investment, profitability and market-to-book on 
managerial incentive compensation, which is consistent with existing empirical evidence.4 
Second, the model generates new prediction not tested in the literature, but that are supported by 
the empirical evidence presented here. Specifically, the model predicts positive effect of 
depreciation on managerial incentive compensation. 
Additionally, this paper provides empirical tests of the model using a U.S.-firm sample. 
To be consistent with the model’s predictions, I estimate simultaneous equations of market 
leverage and pay–performance sensitivity. Pay–performance sensitivity roughly measures dollar 
change in manager wealth per dollar change in stockholder wealth (Yermack (1995)); this 
closely follows the model’s measure of representing managerial incentive compensation. The 
key determinants generated by the model are included as regressors in both equations; these are 
investment, firm size, profitability, depreciation, and market-to-book. Since two dependent 
variables, market leverage and pay performance sensitivity, are simultaneously and 
endogenously determined, I use three-stage least squares (3SLS) to estimate the system. The 
                                                            
3 Rajan and Zingales (1995), Fama and French (2002), and Frank and Goyal (2009). 
4 Murphy (1985), Lewellen et al. (1987), Matsunaga (1995), Mehran (1995), Ittner et al. (2003), and Baker and Hall 
(2004). 
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estimation results strongly support the model and I find similar results when estimating the 
system using book leverage instead of market leverage.  
My model resembles the Morellec (2004) framework in that Morellec considers both 
agency conflicts. This author argues that manager–stockholder conflicts can explain low debt 
levels observed in practice. In his model, the managerial incentive imposed by compensation is 
exogenously given and only leverage is optimally chosen. However, my model features the 
simultaneous and endogenous determination of optimal leverage and managerial incentive 
compensation while taking into account the consequences of both conflicts. Moreover, the focus 
of my model is to provide intuition behind the key determinants of both leverage and managerial 
compensation. 
Cadenillas, Cvitanic and Zapatero (2004) also study joint determination of leverage and 
managerial incentive compensation. In their model, a firm faces only manager–stockholder 
conflict, and both optimal leverage and managerial compensation are determined to ensure that 
the manager exerts as much effort as stockholders wish. In contrast, my model examines more 
comprehensive interaction between leverage and managerial compensation by considering both 
manager–stockholder and stockholder–bondholder conflicts and provides empirically testable 
predictions on what determines the joint optimization. He (2009) models a manager–stockholder 
conflict that causes the manager not to exert as much effort as stockholders wish. This author 
shows that optimal contracting leads small firms to choose high managerial incentive and large 
firms to choose low managerial incentive, since managerial effort is more important in small 
firms. Because debt financing decreases managerial effort (what He calls “debt overhang”), 
small firms optimally choose to have low leverage. My model deals with investment debt 
overhang, not managerial effort overhang, and considers both agency conflicts. Moreover, this 
model encompasses all key determinants, whereas the He model is silent about other key factors 
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such as investment, profitability, market-to-book and depreciation. While Cadenillas, Cvitanic 
and Zaptero (2004) and He (2009) predict that leverage and managerial incentive compensation 
should move together and in opposite directions, respectively, this paper comprises these two. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model. 
Section 3 sets forth the numerical results and generates predictions from the model. Section 4 
presents empirical tests of the predictions. Finally, Section 5 describes the conclusions of this 
study. 
 
2.2. The model 
2.2.1 The unlevered firm with no manager–stockholder conflict 
First, in order to make the model as clear as possible, let us begin with a benchmark case 
that has no agency conflict (case 1). The basic ingredients of the benchmark case are preserved 
in this and all other cases discussed in this paper. 
The firm generates profit π at every period over an infinite time horizon. The profit 
function (π) is determined by capital (K), profitability (or demand) shock (ε), and constant 
marginal cost (mc). Presumably, this profit function results from the optimal choices for other 
inputs such as labor and raw materials. The production function has decreasing returns to scale 
with 0 < s < 1. The concave profit function occurs when the firm faces a downward-sloping 
demand curve. Alternatively, as argued in Lucas (1978), the concavity can stem from limited 
managerial or organizational resources. As in Hennessy and Whited (2005), this profit function 
gives an upward bound of K, K_max. K > K_max is not economically profitable. Thus, the 
decreasing return to scale may represent that investment opportunities decrease in K. The 
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produced outputs sell for price peε, which fluctuates following moves of the profitability shock, ε. 
ε reflects shocks to demand, input price, or productivity. Thus, the profit function is given by 
 
s
tKmcpe t )(   . (1) 
The evolution of (K, ε) is given as follows: 
 dtKIdK ttt )(  , (2) 
 dWdtd t   . (3) 
At every period, K is decreased by depreciation of δK and increased by investment, I. If 
no new investment is made at time t, then in the next period K will be smaller than current K. W 
is a standard Wiener process. When the firm makes a new investment, in other words I > 0, it 
must pay an investment adjustment cost, g(It,Kt), and the relative price of capital goods is 1. I 
assume that investment is not reversible. Following Hennessy (2004), I assume that the 
adjustment cost is a convex function of I; specifically, it is given by 
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Let M and E denote the payoff to the manager and to the shareholders, respectively, after 
optimal investment is chosen. Since the manager is the only shareholder in this case, the manager 
takes an action that maximizes the manager’s payoff and the maximized value is value of equity. 
In other words, M is equal to E. The firm lives forever. The default-free term structure is 
assumed to be flat with instantaneous risk free rate r; investors can borrow and lend freely at this 
rate. The value of equity equals the expected present value of the discounted future cash flows, 
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less investment expenditure and corporate tax. I assume the corporate tax rate to be constant at τ. 
All expectations are taken under the pricing measure Q. Specifically, the equity value is given by 
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In each time period, t, the manager chooses the optimal investment, which maximizes 
equation (5). I denote this optimal investment by It,FB, which is used as a benchmark throughout 
to determine whether the second-best investments are under- or overinvestment. Equity holders 
provide additional funds when internal funding from profits is not sufficient, so long as E1 is 
greater than zero. I assume zero cost for new equity issuance, for simplicity. 
 
2.2.2 The levered firm with no manager–stockholder conflict 
In this section, stockholder-bondholder conflict is added to case (1), or the benchmark 
case explained above. In other words, this second case (case 2) investigates a levered firm in 
which the manager is the only shareholder. I consider a line-of-credit characterized by (i) an 
infinite stream of interest payments, and (ii) a commitment that the firm is liquidated at default. 
The infinite stream of interest payments is chosen to model agency cost of debt, since debt 
maturing before growth options are realized is irrelevant to the investment decision. For 
simplicity, I assume that there is no cost for adjusting capital structure. 
Previous studies assume that the firm pays fixed coupon, c, forever or until it hits a 
refinancing threshold. However, I assume a fixed coupon rate, c, and coupon payment is 
determined by cKt, where Kt is capital at time t. Once the coupon rate is set, the coupon payment 
increases as Kt grows. In other words, the contract is a line-of-credit at a bank in which the 
maximum amount of borrowing is pledged to be some fixed fraction of capital and the interest is 
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also fixed in advance. Then, the firm borrows the maximum and it will always pay the interest of 
cKt, where c is the fixed fraction times the fixed interest rate. By assuming that the coupon 
payment at every period is cKt, my model features dynamic adjustments of capital structure 
without assuming the scaling property (Goldstein et al. (2001) and Strabulaev (2007)).  
When internal cash flow is not sufficient for the promised interest payment at time t, a 
liquidity crisis occurs. In Strabulaev (2007), a portion of assets in place is sold to fill the crisis 
deficiency and the sale results in a decrease in future cash flows. In my model, a firm does not 
sell assets, but instead it fills the gap via equity financing. When this happens, the firm incurs an 
additional cost. This cost may correspond to the decrease in future cash flows in Strabulaev 
(2007). This cost represents, in my model, costly equity financing in unfavorable situations. A 
liquidity shortage may be perceived as an adverse situation for the firm in the market and, hence, 
equity holders may be reluctant to inject additional funds into the firm. The cost of the liquidity 
crisis is proportional to the liquidity shortage, and it is calculated as LC times the shortage. 
Finally, I assume that the cost of the liquidity crisis is affected by a profitability shock. When the 
firm is in a poor state, the firm will have much greater difficulty raising money. In good times, 
on the other hand, financing will be easier, and thus less costly. LC reflects this property. 
The levered firm operates until it reaches bankruptcy threshold. This threshold is chosen 
to maximize equity value. The equity holders choose T, time to default. As in case (1), the 
optimal investment is chosen by the manager. Note that I and T are not determined at date 0, but 
are chosen optimally based on information available at time t. Since the manager is a solitary 
shareholder, the manager chooses both I and T, which maximize equity value. The value of (ex 
post) equity after a credit line has already taken place in this case is given by 
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As shown in the above equation, optimal investment I* and T are chosen to maximize 
equity value given c. Stockholder–bondholder conflicts occur because the manager chooses 
optimal investment to maximize only the equity value after debt has already taken place.  
The optimal investment choice cannot be ex ante contracted and, hence, can be 
suboptimal relative to the first best. The model presumes rational expectation in that both 
shareholders and credit holders correctly anticipate the effect of debt financing on the investment 
decision and the effect of this decision on debt pricing. The market value at time 0 of the line-of-
credit is given by 
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The first component of the above equation represents coupon payments and the second 
component represents the payoff to credit holders at default. When default occurs, credit holders 
receive the liquidation value of assets in place at the time of default less bankruptcy cost, 
reflecting the absolute priority of debt claims. The bankruptcy cost is assumed to be a proportion 
γ of KT, the assets in place at the time of default and, thus, the payoff to credit holders at 
liquidation is (1-γ)KT. I assume that (1-γ) also follows the moves of profitability shock, ε. At 
good times, credit holders can recover a high proportion of K and the opposite happens at bad 
times.5 
                                                            
5 Shleifer and Vishny (1992). 
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2.2.3 The unlevered firm with manager–stockholder conflict 
Generally, there is a separation between a manager and stockholders and the manager 
sometimes pursues her own interests rather than those of equity holders. This is why equity 
holders design executive compensation in such a way so as to align the manager’s interest with 
their own. Managerial compensation is composed of fixed salary and incentive compensation, 
which is intended for the interest alignment. Ignoring the fixed compensation portion of 
managerial compensation is not critical to obtaining my main results. Incentive compensation is 
represented by a proportion, α, of the equity value. The manager–stockholder conflict arises in 
my model from an empire building manager. This case, with its separation between the manager 
and equity holders is referred to as “case (3).” The firm in this case is unlevered. In addition to 
utility from her equity claim, the manager derives perquisites from investment. In particular, the 
manager gets η per unit of investment. The size of η will differ depending on firm or industry 
characteristics; large η means that the manager derives high perquisites per unit of investment. 
Due to this private benefit enjoyed only by the manager, the optimal investment chosen to 
maximize the utility of the manager can be higher than the first best. Both α and η take values 
from [0, 1]. I presume, for simplicity, that both compensation and private benefit are additively 
separable. 
Variable α represents pay–performance sensitivity, which determines how much the 
manager’s wealth changes when the equity holders’ wealth changes by one dollar. As α grows, 
the payoff to the manager from equity becomes large and the private benefit from investment 
becomes small relative to the equity claim of the manager. In other words, the manager’s 
objective function becomes close to that of the shareholders when α approaches 1. The 
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manager’s objective function consists of two parts: (1) incentive compensation and (2) private 
benefit from investment; specifically, it is 
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As in cases (1) and (2), the manager chooses the optimal investment I* that maximizes 
her objective function. Due to the private benefit from investment, the last term in the first line of 
M3, the manager always wishes to invest more than the first best. How much more the manager 
chooses to invest, given K and ε, relative to the first best depends on α. When α is high, the 
optimal investment I* is very close to the first best IFB. Thus, It* is a function of α. Note that the 
manager can overinvest only when there are enough internal funds to support the overinvestment 
in the firm, as shown in the second line above. I presume that cash flows and investment 
decisions are observable, but are not verifiable and thus not contractible. Based on the observed 
information, shareholders inject additional funds only for efficient investment projects. Thus, 
overinvestment is limited by the availability of free cash flow at that time. 
The value of equity depends on the investment decision made by the manager. Thus, the 
equity value is equal to 
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2.2.4 The levered firm with manager–stockholder conflict 
Most of firms in reality are levered and maintain a separation between the manager and 
equity holders. Thus, the manager maximizes a sum of the α proportion of the equity claim of a 
levered firm and the private benefit obtained from investment. Specifically, the sum is given by 
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Note that now coupon payments also restrict free cash flow available to the manager. As 
before, the overinvestment is limited by the availability of free cash flows. Levered firms need to 
make interest payments before they make investments. Thus, debt financing becomes an 
additional device to alleviate the agency conflict between equity holders and the manager. 
Therefore, the optimal I is a function of c. 
Also note the possible role of α in making the underinvestment problem severe. Since the 
manager wishes to invest more than the first best due to private benefit from investment but is 
limited by coupon payments, the resulting investment chosen to maximize the above objective 
function would be between the I* in cases (2) and (3). In case (2), underinvestment reaches its 
maximum because the manager has no incentive to invest more than the level that stockholders 
want. On the other hand, in case (3), the overinvestment reaches its maximum because the 
manager always wishes to invest more and the free cash flows are not limited by coupon 
21 
 
payments. When α increases, the M4 will converge to M2 and, hence, the optimal investment will 
become smaller. In other words, when the manager’s interest is better aligned with that of the 
equity holders, the underinvestment problem becomes more severe in levered firms. In this sense, 
high α can aggravate the underinvestment problem caused by debt financing. Therefore, the 
optimal I is determined by α as well. 
Again, the value of equity depends on the investment decision made by the manager, and 
the equity holders choose when to liquidate the firm. As in case (2), the default time T is not 
chosen at time 0, but chosen optimally based on information available at time t. The equity value 
is 
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The market value at time 0 of the credit line is the same as the market value (7) in Section 2 in 
that it depends on decisions on investments and default time, and is 
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By rational expectation, as mentioned above, the suboptimal investment choices are 
priced in the market value of credit. Additionally, the benefit of credit by limiting free cash flows 
available to the manager is also priced.  
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2.2.5 Optimal leverage and incentive compensation 
Incentive compensation provides benefits in terms of mitigating agency conflicts between 
equity holders and a manager. Higher α reduces the overinvestment incentive of the manager by 
making the manager’s objective function closely resemble that of the shareholders. Thus, higher 
α decreases the overinvestment-related agency cost. On the other hand, it aggravates the agency 
conflict between shareholders and debt holders. As α increases, the manager’s interest is more 
aligned with that of the shareholders, thus the manager is more likely to underinvest at the 
expense of debt holders. Reflecting rational expectations, this is priced in the market value of 
debt. Therefore, shareholders of high α firms need to pay a high price for debt financing relative 
to shareholders of low α firms. This tradeoff is taken into consideration when optimal α is chosen. 
Like incentive compensation, debt also yields both benefits and costs. Debt can be 
problematic in that it causes an underinvestment problem, debt overhang and, hence, increases 
debt financing cost and decreases firm value. Also, high debt significantly increases bankruptcy 
probability. On the other hand, debt can alleviate the agency problem between equity holders and 
the empire building manager. As mentioned above, overinvestment is limited by free cash flow 
available to the manager. If a firm is highly levered and thus has large coupon payment 
obligations, free cash flow will be very limited. For firms with high levels of free cash flows, 
debt financing may be beneficial. Additionally, such firms may enjoy large tax shield from 
interest payments. Therefore, these should also be considered when optimal leverage is chosen. 
Optimal α and c are chosen simultaneously by the equity holders at time 0 by balancing 
benefits and costs, as discussed above. At this point, it is important to note that optimal decisions 
on α and c are made to maximize ex ante equity value. The value of equity ex post is given by 
the present value of cash flow accruing to shareholders after debt is already in place. The optimal 
23 
 
investment and default threshold are typically determined to maximize the ex post equity value. 
The value of equity ex ante is the sum of the ex post equity value and the market value of debt. 
Optimal leverage and incentive compensation are determined to maximize the ex ante equity 
value. Specifically, 
 c*, α* = arg max [ E4 + D4 | I*]. (13) 
The above equation (14) states that equity holders maximize the sum of (i) the present 
value of the after-tax cash flows accruing to equity, and (ii) the present value of the income 
payments to all debt claims to be issued. Note that the total value takes into account the future 
capital structure adjustment that will occur subsequent to each refinancing point, when the firm 
makes new investments. 
The model assumes that equity holders choose both optimal leverage and incentive 
compensation. Most of previous studies assume that leverage is determined to maximize ex ante 
equity value (firm value) since they assume no conflict between manager and stockholders. Even 
in the presence of manager-stockholder separation, the model assumes that equity holders still 
choose the optimal leverage since it considers only a conflict in investment decisions. 
Empirically, leverage of a firm has strong persistence over time.  
 
2.3. Numerical results and testable predictions 
2.3.1 Numerical methodology 
This section investigates the cross-sectional determinants of optimal leverage ratios and 
incentive compensation in equilibrium. Ultimately, I am interested in determining whether the 
model can simulate the effects of key determinants of leverage and incentive compensation. I use 
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numerical analyses to generate the predictions and, in the Section 4, I use COMPUSTAT and 
Execucomp data to find empirical evidence.  
I solve the model via iteration on Bellman equation until the value function converges. At 
every period, the manager chooses optimal investment that maximizes her objective function, M4, 
given a discretized space of (K,ε). The Bellman equation that the manager solves to choose I* at 
time t is 
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After solving for optimal investments for all possible combinations of α and c, the equity 
holders will choose, at time 0, simultaneously optimal α and c that maximize the ex ante equity 
value (or firm value), which is E4+D4. 
I parameterize my model along the lines of the relevant literature. The risk free rate, r, is 
6%, and the mean and volatility of the profitability shock are µ = 0 and σ = 0.5, respectively. The 
corporate tax rate, τ, is 0.3. The depreciation rate, δ, is 0.15, and the production scale factor, s, is 
0.689, all consistent with Hennessy and Whited (2005). The private benefit per unit of 
investment, η, is 0.05. When I solve for different parameter sets, the main predictions on the 
effect of key determinants described below do not change. 
Knowledge of optimal policies and the value functions allows me to compute key 
variables generated by the model, as shown in Table 1. Specifically, I define my variables to 
mimic variables used in the empirical literature and the definitions closely follow those used by 
Hennessy and Whited (2005). 
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 2.3.2 Testable predictions 
Before proceeding to my main predictions, I solve the model for cases (1), (2), and (3) 
and a brief summary is depicted in Figure 1. The first line of Figure 1 reports figures for case (2) 
with the First Best or case (1) for comparison. In Panels A and B, we observe underinvestment, 
since case (2) addresses levered firms without separation. Panels A and B show investment at 
low and high profitability states of ε. High c value means high debt financing. Note that 
underinvestment caused by debt is observable in both states of profitability and underinvestment 
is severe at low K. If a firm comes into the current period with a high stock of outstanding debt, 
it will choose lower investment than the other firms with a low stock. And underinvestment is 
severe for small firms. Moreover, firms with poor profitability, as shown in Panel A, go bankrupt 
even with moderate levels of debt financing. However, debt also provides a tax shield since 
interest payments are tax deductible. Firms with relatively low leverage ratios are more valuable 
than those with zero leverage ratios, because of tax advantages (this graph is not reported, but 
available upon request). Thus, it is optimal to keep some debt on the firm’s balance sheet even 
though debt causes investment distortion.  
The second line of Figure 1 reports figures for case (3) with the benchmark (FB) of case 
(1). Since in case (3) we have unlevered firms with separation, we observe overinvestment 
relative to the first best. In contrast to underinvestment, overinvestment is observable only in 
firms at good states (high profitability states), as shown in Panel D, since overinvestment is 
limited by free cash flow availability. Also note that α holds a significant implication for 
overinvestment. When α is small, private benefit from overinvestment is larger than the α 
proportion of equity. However, as α grows, the private benefit is overwhelmed by payoffs from 
equity claims and, hence overinvestment decreases. 
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Panel D of Figure 1 shows that overinvestment decreases substantially when capital K is 
high and overinvestment is severe when capital K is low, due to decreasing returns to scale of 
production. This may contradict what we usually think of overinvestment. It is because the 
model only considers non-negative NPV investment opportunities. Small firms have a lot of 
investment opportunities with non-negative expected returns even though all investment options 
are not value maximizing. In order to enjoy private benefit, a manager would want to choose a 
level of investment which exceeds the value maximizing level. On the other hands, large firms 
do not have a large investment set with positive expected returns. Thus, even for highly 
profitable firms, there is little overinvestment when K is high. One can regard this as that 
managers at small firms have more discretion since they have more investment options and, 
hence, managerial incentive is more important to make them choose value maximizing options. 
              The optimal choices of α and c become different when the firm has both manager–
stockholder and stockholder–bondholder conflicts. Figure 2 provides optimal investment choices 
at low and high profitability states of case (4). Panel A of Figure 2 shows investment at the low 
profit state and Panel B shows its counterpart at the high profit state. The first thing to note in 
both figures is that higher α leads to more underinvestment when the firm is levered. The more 
interests are aligned between equity holders and the manager, the lower the optimal chosen 
investment is when the firm is levered. In other words, when there is no discrepancy between 
equity holders and the manager, the underinvestment is most severe and when there is maximum 
discrepancy, the underinvestment is not a significant problem, due to the manager’s 
overinvestment incentive. Thus, underinvestment cost of leverage increases when α increases. 
However, it is noteworthy that overinvestment decreases when c (debt financing) increases. Debt 
financing provides the additional benefit in mitigating the free cash flow problem on top of the 
tax advantage. However, even with very high leverage, overinvestment is not completely 
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eliminated when α is very small, as shown in Panel B. Moreover, the benefit of leverage in 
reducing overinvestment may be minimal when α is sufficiently large. 
After taking into account the tradeoff between leverage and managerial incentive 
compensation discussed above, the equity holders choose optimal α and c to maximize the ex 
ante equity value. To minimize the conflict between the equity holders and the manager, the 
equity holders can employ either high α or high c, or both. The equity holders may choose to use 
high incentive compensation. However, as explained above, this may end up decreasing the 
value of equity if the firm is levered since this leads to more severe underinvestment and, hence, 
increases ex ante debt financing costs. If the equity holders use both, overinvestment can 
decrease significantly, but underinvestment will increase substantially. Thus, we can expect that 
the equity holders will not use both at the same time unless the overinvestment cost is very large. 
Generally, incentive compensation is preferred to debt in alleviating manager–stockholder 
conflicts. This is because even high leverage cannot entirely eliminate overinvestment and high 
leverage causes a decrease in firm value through underinvestment. However, when the 
manager’s overinvestment incentive is not strong, the equity holders do not need to give strong 
incentive compensation to the manager. Since underinvestment cost can be reduced when the 
incentive given by the compensation package is weak, debt financing is preferred due to its tax 
advantages. The equity holders will decide on optimal α and c, balancing these benefits and costs 
as determined by firm characteristics. 
Now I proceed to the main testable predictions of the model, how variables of interest 
affect managerial incentive compensation and the leverage ratio in equilibrium. The equity 
holders choose optimal c and α based on the variables for firm characteristics. The equilibrium 
relationships tell us why a firm with particular characteristics chooses any given optimal 
incentive compensation and leverage ratio. The Figures 3 to 7 plot the variables calculated in 
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Table 1; each point is obtained by averaging the variables over ε and points that correspond very 
small Ks (bottom10) are dropped. As one can see in the Figures, obtained values for optimal 
leverage and managerial incentive compensation are close to what we observe in practice; 
leverage ranges between 0.05 and 0.7 and managerial incentive compensation is between 0.04 
and 0.08. Note that the optimal managerial incentive compensation is very small. Perfect 
alignment of interests between a manager and stockholders is not optimal. Moreover, without 
consideration of manager’s risk aversion, the joint optimization can generate sufficiently low 
level of optimal pay performance sensitivity. 
The first variable of interest is investment. Investment represents investment ratio to book 
assets. We can expect that incentive compensation rather than debt is more likely to be used for 
investment intensive firms. The equilibrium relationships are plotted in Figure 3. The model 
predicts that high investment needs lead the firm to choose a high α, as shown in Panel A of 
Figure 3. Both incentive compensation and debt financing can mitigate the overinvestment 
problem. However, since firms with high investment needs cannot be highly levered due to the 
underinvestment problem, only incentive compensation can be employed. Hence, the equilibrium 
relation between α’s and investments is positive. Panel B of Figure 3 illustrates the equilibrium 
relationship between investments and leverage ratios. As shown in Figure 1, underinvestment is 
more severe for firms with high investment needs. Since such firms choose strong managerial 
incentives, high debt financing will aggravate the underinvestment problem. Therefore, 
investment has a negative effect on optimal market leverage. 
Panel A of Figure 4 again plots the relationship between investment and optimal market 
leverage. Note that we observe both overinvestment and underinvestment, as shown in Panel B 
of Figure 4. The y-axis values are differences between the first best investments and the second 
best investments, and a positive difference represents underinvestment. Importantly, high 
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leverage ratios do not necessarily mean underinvestment. Since firms with high investment needs, 
anticipating underinvestment, choose not to issue much debt and managers of the firms may have 
overinvestment incentives, investments chosen by such firms are not necessarily below the first 
best investments. Some previous studies examine the existence of debt overhang by regressing 
investments on leverage ratios or leverage-related measures. Figure 4 suggests that simply 
regressing investments on leverage ratios may not be the correct way to detect underinvestment. 
I acknowledge that it may be challenging to find actual underinvestment empirically since it is 
hard to identify the first best level of investment for a firm.  
Figure 5 plots a negative effect of firm size on managerial incentive compensation and a 
positive effect of firm size on market leverage. As shown in Figure 1, small firms are more likely 
to have a severe overinvestment problem or more discretion of managers than large firms. To 
mitigate this problem, stockholders of small firms choose high-powered incentive compensation 
for their managers. As discussed above, severe overinvestment cannot be entirely eliminated 
even by high leverage. Thus, small firms choose strong managerial incentive compensation. Due 
to the tradeoff between managerial incentive and leverage, they avoid high leverage. On the 
other hand, overinvestment is not much of a concern to large firms, hence they do not need high 
levels of managerial incentive compensation. They choose high leverage which confers the tax 
advantage and mitigates the overinvestment problem somewhat. By choosing low managerial 
incentive compensation, underinvestment cost can be minimized. This generates a negative 
relation between optimal α’s and K, book assets, and a positive relation between optimal market 
leverage and K, as shown in Figure 5.  
  My model also generates a negative relation between profitability and leverage ratio as 
shown in Panel B in Figure 6. The model suggests that a dynamic tradeoff model without 
adjustment cost and with a multi-period debt can also generate this important relationship, which 
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is empirically robust. Also, the model predicts the positive effect of profitability on managerial 
incentive compensation, which is not tested in the literature. As shown above Figure 1, high 
profitability leads the manager to make overinvestment. Thus, strong incentive compensation 
needs to be employed when profit is high since, as discussed above, severe overinvestment is not 
eliminated even with high leverage. Due to the tradeoff between managerial incentive and 
leverage, the highly profitable firms choose low leverage. Additionally, since growth in 
profitability increases the value of the firm, which is a denominator of market leverage, this can 
lead to a decrease in leverage, as in a dynamic tradeoff model with adjustment cost. 
The model also generates the effects of market-to-book. The first graph of Figure 7 
shows the positive relation between market-to-book and optimal α. The second reports the 
negative relation between market-to-book and optimal leverage. In the absence of market timing, 
the model generates a negative relationship between market-to-book and leverage. Market-to-
book can be decomposed into three parts in the model: profitability, investment opportunities, 
and book assets. M, the market value of the firm, is E4+D4 and it comprises current and future 
production and investment. When current and future profitability is good, M increases. When 
everything else remains unchanged and investment opportunities increase, M increases as well. 
K in the denominator represents book assets, which is firm size. As discussed above, the optimal 
α increases and the optimal leverage decreases when profit and investment increase and size 
decreases. This mechanism generates the patterns shown in Figure 7. 
Additionally, the model provides a new determinant of both incentive compensation and 
leverage, which is the depreciation rate of the firm. When assets of a firm are depreciated deeply, 
the firm needs to make more investment every period to maintain the level of optimal capital for 
production. Since depreciation rate is closely linked to investment needs, this argument is similar 
to the one that explains the effects of investment. A firm with a high depreciation rate, which 
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means high investment needs every period, employs low debt and strong incentive compensation.  
In other words, the depreciation rate has a positive effect on optimal managerial incentive 
compensation and a negative effect on optimal leverage. Since depreciation rate is one of the 
parameters for simulation, I report the averages of optimal α’s and leverages after solving the 
model at different depreciation rate. The averages of optimal α’s are 0.0151, 0.0531, and 0.3542, 
at depreciation rates of 0.05, 0.15, and 0.3, respectively. The corresponding averages of optimal 
leverages are 0.4185, 0.4121, and 0.6149, respectively. When the depreciation rate increases 
from 0.15 to 0.3, optimal c’s actually decreases (less debt financing), but the market leverage 
increases. These values are calculated by averaging the optimal α and leverage at all 
combinations of K and ε. 
Finally, the model generates a prediction on the relationship of optimal leverage and 
optimal incentive compensation with private benefit that the manager enjoys per unit of 
investment. This is denoted as η in the model. High η means that the manager of the firm can 
enjoy large private benefit per unit of investment. Then, the manager has very strong incentive to 
overinvest. The equity holders would want to employ a compensation package that includes a 
high powered incentive scheme, meaning high α. For the benchmark case with η = 0.05, I obtain 
the average of optimal α’s to be 0.0531. When I change η to 0.01 and 0.2, the average becomes 
0.0113 and 0.2191, respectively. These values are calculated by averaging the optimal α’s for all 
K and ε. The effect on optimal α is easily predictable. However, what would be the effect on 
leverage choices? According to the arguments presented above, when there is strong incentive 
compensation, low debt financing is desirable to minimize underinvestment. On the other hand, 
when the overinvestment problem is severe, the equity holders may want to use both debt and 
incentive compensation. The model suggests that leverage ratios do not necessarily decrease, 
even with very high α’s, when the overinvestment incentive of the manager is very strong. The 
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model predicts that the averages of the optimal leverage ratios are 0.4106, 0.4121, and 0.4120 
when values of η are 0.01, 0.05, and 1, respectively. Thus, within the range of η examined here, 
both leverage and managerial compensation increase when η increases, but the effect of private 
benefit mainly manifest in managerial incentive compensation. 
 
2.4. Empirical evidence 
In this section, I empirically assess the main predictions of the model. 
2.4.1 Data and variables 
I obtain relevant accounting data from COMPUSTAT and data on executive 
compensation from Standard and Poor’s Execucomp database. The data set includes executives 
who are identified by Execucomp as CEOs. Consistent with prior research, the data set excludes 
firms in the finance and utilities industries. Firms without information on pay–performance 
sensitivity and market leverage, the main variables of analysis, are also dropped from the sample. 
This results in an unbalanced panel of 1,920 firms over the period 1992–2008. 
For α in the model, I employ Pay performance sensitivity, which roughly represents the 
change in the dollar value of the executive’s wealth per dollar change in the wealth of 
stockholders. It is calculated as the sum of the fraction of managerial stock ownership and the 
sensitivity generated by new awards of stock options, following Yermack (1995). The sensitivity 
by stock options uses the Black-Scholes (1973) option valuation model, as modified by Merton 
(1973) to account for dividends. Specifically, it is calculated from the product of two terms: the 
Black-Scholes formula’s partial derivative with respect to stock price times the fraction of equity 
represented by the option award. For awards about which detailed information is not available, I 
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assume that exercise price is equal to the fiscal year-end stock price at the time of award and that 
time to expiration is 10 years. 
Market leverage ratio is used to match the leverage in the model. Market leverage is the 
most recently reported book value of debt, divided by debt book value plus year-end market 
capitalization. I also use book leverage, which is defined as debt book value, divided by book 
value of assets. The book leverage does not exactly match the leverage in the model, but many 
properties of market leverage are carried over to book leverage.  
The variables of interest are investment, size, profitability, market-to-book and 
depreciation. These are defined to match the model and to coincide with the literature. 
Investment is measured by dividing CAPEX by book assets. Size is defined as the log of book 
value of total assets. Profitability is defined as operating income divided by book assets. 
Depreciation is defined as depreciation divided by book assets. I use the industry average of the 
depreciation rate since variation in individual firm depreciation rates may merely reflect different 
accounting methods that firms employ, not actual differences in the depreciation rates. Market-
to-book is the sum of market capitalization and book value of debt, divided by book value of 
assets. 
Since there are other important variables that affect pay–performance sensitivity and 
market leverage separately, I consider as control variables the variables used in related literatures. 
As determinants of the pay–performance sensitivity, CEO characteristics and other compensation 
components should be included in a regression. Among several variables of CEO characteristics, 
I employ CEO age and tenure. Tenure measures the number of years the CEO has held that 
position. I also include salary as one of the regressors for pay–performance sensitivity and its log 
value is used in the regressions. As an important determinant of leverage ratios, I use tangibility. 
Tangibility is defined as property, plant, and equipment divided by total assets. 
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Table 2 reports descriptive statistics for the sample. All variables are CPI deflated. All 
numbers are similar to values reported in related literature such as Coles, Daniel and Naveen 
(2006). 
 
 2.4.2 Empirical approach 
The model suggests that pay performance sensitivity and market leverage are jointly 
determined. This is consistent with what is observed in practice, since managerial incentive and 
leverage are not exogenously given but are endogenously determined. Thus, estimating the 
equations of pay performance sensitivity and market leverage separately is not a proper way to 
test predictions generated by the model, because the parameter estimates will be biased, since 
regressors are endogenously determined along with the dependent variable. Thus, I adopt 
simultaneous equations approach. My econometric model has two equations. The first has 
market leverage as the dependent variable and the second has pay performance sensitivity as the 
dependent variable. To conform to the underlying reasoning for simultaneous equations and for 
the model, I use contemporaneous rather than lag values of variables. The systems I estimate are 
as follows: 
 (A) 
ܯܽݎ݇݁ݐ ܮ݁ݒ݁ݎܽ݃݁ 
ൌ  ߙ଴ ൅ ߙଵܫ݊ݒ݁ݏݐ݉݁݊ݐ ൅ ߙଶܵ݅ݖ݁ ൅ ߙଷܲݎ݋݂݅ݐܾ݈ܽ݅݅ݐݕ ൅ ߙସܦ݁݌ݎ݁ܿ݅ܽݐ݅݋݊
൅ ߙହܯܽݎ݇݁ݐ െ ݐ݋ െ ܾ݋݋݇ ൅ ߙ଺ܲܽݕ ݌݁ݎ݂݋ݎ݉ܽ݊ܿ݁ ݏ݁݊ݏ݅ݐ݅ݒ݅ݐݕ 
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ܲܽݕ ݌݁ݎ݂݋ݎ݉ܽ݊ܿ݁ ݏ݁݊ݏ݅ݐ݅ݒ݅ݐݕ
ൌ  ߚ଴ ൅ ߚଵܫ݊ݒ݁ݏݐ݉݁݊ݐ ൅ ߚଶܵ݅ݖ݁ ൅ ߚଷܲݎ݋݂݅ݐܾ݈ܽ݅݅ݐݕ
൅ ߚସܦ݁݌ݎ݁ܿ݅ܽݐ݅݋݊൅ߚହܯܽݎ݇݁ݐ െ ݐ݋ െ ܾ݋݋݇ ൅  ߚ଺ܯܽݎ݇݁ݐ ܮ݁ݒ݁ݎܽ݃݁ 
 (B) 
ܯܽݎ݇݁ݐ ܮ݁ݒ݁ݎܽ݃݁ 
ൌ  ߙ଴ ൅ ߙଵܫ݊ݒ݁ݏݐ݉݁݊ݐ ൅ ߙଶܵ݅ݖ݁ ൅ ߙଷܲݎ݋݂݅ݐܾ݈ܽ݅݅ݐݕ ൅ ߙସܦ݁݌ݎ݁ܿ݅ܽݐ݅݋݊
൅ ߙହܯܽݎ݇݁ݐ െ ݐ݋ െ ܾ݋݋݇ ൅ ߙ଺ܲܽݕ ݌݁ݎ݂݋ݎ݉ܽ݊ܿ݁ ݏ݁݊ݏ݅ݐ݅ݒ݅ݐݕ
൅ ߙ଻ܾ݈ܶܽ݊݃݅݅݅ݐݕ 
ܲܽݕ ݌݁ݎ݂݋ݎ݉ܽ݊ܿ݁ ݏ݁݊ݏ݅ݐ݅ݒ݅ݐݕ
ൌ  ߚ଴ ൅ ߚଵܫ݊ݒ݁ݏݐ݉݁݊ݐ ൅ ߚଶܵ݅ݖ݁ ൅ ߚଷܲݎ݋݂݅ݐܾ݈ܽ݅݅ݐݕ ൅ ߚସܦ݁݌ݎ݁ܿ݅ܽݐ݅݋݊
൅ ൅ߚହܯܽݎ݇݁ݐ െ ݐ݋ െ ܾ݋݋݇ ൅  ߚ଺ܤ݋݋݇ ܮ݁ݒ݁ݎܽ݃݁ ൅ ߚ଻݈ܵܽܽݎݕ ൅ ߚ଼ܶ݁݊ݑݎ݁
൅ ߚଽܣ݃݁ 
 
As shown in the above equations, market leverage and pay performance sensitivity are 
endogenously determined in the system. Thus, I use 3SLS to estimate the system. System A 
shown above has only the variables predicted by the model. The system A is not identified since 
in both equations, there is no excluded exogenous variable. To estimate the system, I employ 
additional variables to be used as instruments. These are CEO salary, tenure, age, and tangibility. 
CEO salary, tenure, and age have important effects on managerial incentive, but do not 
necessarily affect leverage decisions. They often used as instruments of CEO incentive in 
relevant studies. Also, tangibility does not affect managerial incentive, but it has a positive effect 
on leverage. Campello (2006) also use tangibility as an instrument of leverage. On the other hand, 
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system B is identified. The pay performance sensitivity equation is identified due to tangibility 
and the market leverage equation is identified due to excluded exogenous variables, such as 
salary, tenure, and age. All exogenous variables in the system are used as instruments in the 
3SLS estimation. 
 
2.4.3 Empirical results 
As shown in Tables 3, I find results consistent with the predictions generated by the 
model. Table 3 reports the estimation results for simultaneous equations of pay performance 
sensitivity and market leverage. Model A includes only those key determinants generated by the 
model, and Model B adds all control variables on top of the key variables, as shown in the above 
regression equations. 
The signs of the coefficients of the key variables are as expected from the model. 
Investment has a significant and negative effect on market leverage and a positive effect on pay 
performance sensitivity. In other words, firms that need to make large investments issue less debt 
and choose to have strong managerial incentives. The positive coefficient of size in the 
regression of market leverage reconfirms the well-known size effect. Additionally, as expected, 
the coefficient of size in the regression of pay performance sensitivity is significantly negative. 
This suggests that small firms worrying about both under- and overinvestment choose to give 
managers strong incentive compensation, and large firms in which overinvestment cost is 
minimal choose to issue more debt to utilize the tax benefits, because they need not keep 
managers highly incentivized. Again, the negative coefficient of profitability in the regression of 
market leverage is consistent with the literature. The positive coefficient of profitability in the 
regression of pay performance sensitivity supports my model. Highly profitable firms in which 
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the manager has high levels of free cash flow to overinvest wish to keep strong managerial 
incentive alignment with the equity holders and, hence, choose to issue less debt. The opposite is 
true for unprofitable firms. 
Depreciation has significant effects on both market leverage and pay–performance 
sensitivity, as shown in Table 3. Firms with high depreciation rates choose to issue less debt, due 
to concern about high investment needs, hence they maintain strong managerial incentives. Fama 
and French (2002) also employ depreciation as a regressor of leverage ratios and show negative 
coefficients. However, these authors use depreciation to measure non-debt tax shield. According 
to the results from simultaneous estimation presented in this paper, the effect of depreciation can 
be better explained by investment concerns. Market-to-book is shown to have a positive effect on 
pay-performance sensitivity and a negative effect on market leverage. Consistent with the 
model’s prediction, high expected profitability and investment opportunities lead the firm to 
choose high-powered incentive compensation and low leverage. 
Finally, market leverage increases pay performance sensitivity and pay performance 
sensitivity increases market leverage; this result comprises the opposing arguments in existing 
literature about the relation between them. In the literature, the relationship between them is 
often hypothesized to be negative due to debt agency costs. He (2009) also predicts a negative 
relation and actual correlation between them from the data is negative. On the other hand, 
Cadenillas, Cvitanic and Zapatero (2004) predict a positive relation since leverage decreases 
managerial compensation from equity and, hence, increase manager’s sensitivity to firm 
performance. As argued above, the tradeoff between leverage and managerial incentive 
compensation manifests in the effects of key determinants and leverage. The negative relation is 
captured by the opposite effects of key determinants. They have positive effect on each other 
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when they are estimated simultaneously and the opposite effects from key determinants are 
controlled. 
The estimates for other control variables such as tangibility, age, tenure, and salary are 
consistent with previous findings. Tangibility has a positive effect on leverage. Age and salary 
have negative effects and tenure has a positive effect on pay performance sensitivity. In addition 
to estimation results of simultaneous equations, the Hausman specification test also suggests 
joint determination of market leverage and pay performance sensitivity.   
Table 4 reports the estimation results for book leverage. As shown in the tables, most of 
the results for market leverage are preserved for book leverage. Table 5 presents robustness 
checks. Panel A reports 3SLS estimation results when stock return volatility is included as a 
regressor in both equations since the volatility can also be an important determinant of pay 
performance sensitivity and market leverage, even though the model does not consider the risk 
factor. The coefficients of volatility in both equations are along the line with existing literature. 
Panel B reports 2SLS estimation results with robust standard errors since 3SLS is sensitive to 
specification errors. Panel C reports 2SLS results with standard errors which are clustered by 
firm identifier. The estimation results shown in Table 5 again confirm the predictions generated 
by the model. 
Taken together, these results provide strong evidence in favor of the model. They suggest 
that leverage and managerial incentive are jointly determined and, hence, same factors affect 
both leverage and managerial incentive compensation. Due to a tradeoff in the joint optimization, 
the directions of effects from the key factors on market leverage and pay performance sensitivity 
are opposite. These dual effects of key determinants bolster the arguments based on the joint 
optimization. There are other explanations behind the determinants, but no previous theory can 
explain the dual effects. Finally, I show that the relationship between leverage and pay–
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performance sensitivity is significantly positive when the two are simultaneously estimated and 
the tradeoff between them is controlled. 
 
2.5. Conclusion 
This paper is the first to provide both theory and empirical evidence on the joint 
determination of leverage and managerial incentive compensation. Leverage and managerial 
incentive compensation interact with each other through manager–stockholder conflicts and 
stockholder–bondholder conflicts. To minimize manager–stockholder conflict, the stockholders 
can employ either high leverage or strong managerial incentive, or both. Low pay–performance 
sensitivity can alleviate the overinvestment problem substantially. In contrast, to achieve the 
same goal, the firm must issue a large quantity of debt with no help from managerial incentive 
compensation. Moreover, debt financing always leads the firm to under invest. The degree of 
underinvestment in the levered firm reaches its maximum when the manager’s interests are 
perfectly aligned with those of stockholders. When managerial incentive compensation increases, 
the marginal benefit of leverage in alleviating manager–stockholder conflicts increases and the 
marginal cost of leverage in aggravating stockholder-bondholder conflicts grows. In other words, 
there exists a tradeoff between leverage and managerial incentive compensation. Thus, the 
stockholders will not use both high leverage and strong managerial incentive at the same time, 
unless the overinvestment cost is very high. Which one is chosen by the stockholders will depend 
on firm characteristics that represent relative underinvestment and overinvestment costs. For 
high growth firms, underinvestment is more of a concern, so such firms may not wish to use high 
levels of debt financing, but strong managerial incentives instead. However, when the manager’s 
desire to overinvestment is not strong due to the limited investment opportunities available to the 
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firm, the stockholders need not grant high incentive compensation to the manager. Since 
underinvestment cost is relatively small when the incentive created by the compensation package 
is weak, debt financing is preferred for its tax advantages. 
The empirical evidence presented in this paper supports the model of joint determination. 
I estimate simultaneous equations of market leverage and pay–performance sensitivity. As 
predicted by the model, the tradeoff manifests in the effects of key determinants. The standard 
determinants of leverage move the optimal pay–performance sensitivity in opposite direction. 
Investment, profitability, market-to-book, and depreciation rate have negative effects on leverage, 
but positive effects on pay–performance sensitivity. Firm size has a positive effect on leverage, 
but a negative effect on pay–performance sensitivity. After controlling for the tradeoff effect, 
optimal leverage and pay–performance sensitivity have a positive effect on each other. 
The empirical analysis presented in this paper is limited to testing a subset of testable 
hypotheses generated by the model, leaving several issues open for future research. The 
hypothesis on private benefit per investment should be tested. As discussed above section 3, the 
private benefit can affect both leverage and managerial incentive compensation in the same 
direction. Very large private benefit leads stockholders to choose high leverage and high 
managerial incentive compensation. However, the effect of private benefit appears mainly in 
managerial incentive compensation. An increase in the private benefit results in a dramatic 
increase in the managerial incentive compensation and a small increase in leverage. Identifying 
the appropriate way to measure the private benefit enjoyed by the manager is a challenge. The 
size of the private benefit can vary by firm and industry characteristics.  
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2.6. Figures and Tables 
Figure 2.1. Cases (2) and (3). This figure plots optimal investments in case (2) (Panels A 
and B) and in case (3) (Panels C and D). Panels A and C correspond low profitability state 
and Panels B and D correspond high profitability state. 
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Figure 2.2. Case (4), before joint optimization: Panel A plots optimal investments at a low 
profit state and Panel B plots optimal investments at a high profit state for a range of α. 
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Figure 2.3. The effect of investment on managerial incentive compensation (Panel A) and 
leverage (Panel B) after joint optimization. 
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Figure 2.4. Debt overhang: Panel A plots the relationship between optimal market leverage 
and investment and Panel B plots whether optimal second best investments exceed first 
best investment. 
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Figure 2.5. The effect of firm size on managerial incentive compensation (Panel A) and 
leverage (Panel B) after joint optimization. 
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Figure 2.6. The effect of profitability on managerial incentive compensation (Panel A) and 
leverage (Panel B) after joint optimization. 
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Figure 2.7. The effect of market-to-book on managerial incentive compensation (Panel A) 
and leverage (Panel B) after joint optimization. 
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Table 2.1. Key variables generated by the model 
All variables are calculated at time 0. D04 considers debt issued at time 0 and does not include new debt 
yet to be issued. 
Firm size (Book assets) K 
Ratio of investment to book assets I*/K 
Market leverage D04/(E4+D4) 
Market-to-book (E4+D4)/K 
Profitability (Peε-mc)Ks/K 
 
 
Table 2.2. Summary statistics 
 Mean Standard deviation 25
th percentile 50th percentile 75th percentile 
CEO characteristics 
Pay-performance 
sensitivity 
.0272223 .0610521 .0028049 .0065949 .0237264 
(log)Salary 6.253477 .8287946 5.968114 6.309918 6.684612 
Tenure 7.100707 7.215219 2 5 10 
Age 55.49138 7.340227 50 56 61 
Firm characteristics 
Market leverage .2029 .1918406 .0536549 .1545528 .3053405 
Book leverage .2200379 .2195065 .0996196 .2002632 .3054089 
Investment .3347083 1.559892 .1303667 .2285438 .3945061 
Market-to-book 2.183796 2.291915 1.155838 1.653101 2.424053 
Size 7.403017 1.793365 6.176452 7.210101 8.565923 
Profitability .1063695 .2007889 .0636941 .1350885 .1859304 
Depreciation rate .0468936 .0726691 .0253078 .0336075 .0447449 
Tangibility .2752211 .2038485 .1251604 .2135921 .3802689 
49 
 
Table 2.3. Simultaneous equations of Pay performance sensitivity and Market leverage 
 Model A Model B 
 Pay 
performance 
sensitivity 
Market 
leverage 
Pay 
performance 
sensitivity 
Market 
leverage 
Investment .00144*** 
(.00028) 
-.00325*** 
(.00069) 
.00107*** 
(.00023) 
-.00203*** 
(.00068) 
Size -.02388*** 
(.00048) 
.05625*** 
(.00075) 
-.00993*** 
(.00062) 
.04606*** 
(.00081) 
Profitability .10836*** 
(.00307) 
-.25742*** 
(.00596) 
.05118*** 
(.00360) 
-.25002*** 
(.00617) 
Market-to-book .00851*** 
(.00028) 
-.02097*** 
(.00050) 
.00232*** 
(.00033) 
-.01903*** 
(.00049) 
Depreciation  .01622*** 
(.00625) 
-.02709* 
(.01527) 
.04036*** 
(.00520) 
-.04886*** 
(.01538) 
Pay–performance 
sensitivity 
 2.05534*** 
(.04244) 
 .70118*** 
(.06050) 
Market leverage .40106*** 
(.00974) 
 .08651*** 
(.01536) 
 
Salary   -.00571*** 
(.00048) 
 
Tenure   .00237*** 
(.00006) 
 
Age   -.00009 
(.00007) 
 
     
Tangibility    .11728*** 
(.00586) 
R2 0.055 0.2619 0.1627 0.2784 
No. of observations 20423 20423 20423 20423 
Significant at 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*). 
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Table 2.4. Simultaneous equations of Pay performance sensitivity and Book leverage 
 Model A Model B 
 Pay 
performance 
sensitivity 
Book 
leverage 
Pay 
performance 
sensitivity 
Book 
leverage 
Investment .00108*** 
(.00024) 
-.00446*** 
(.00093) 
.00113*** 
(.00023) 
-.00342*** 
(.00092) 
Size -.00879*** 
(.00028) 
.02156*** 
(.00109) 
-.00682*** 
(.00028) 
.01442*** 
(.00109) 
Profitability .04584*** 
(.00276) 
-.21705*** 
(.00819) 
.04504*** 
(.00274) 
-.24235*** 
(.00831) 
Market-to-book .00071*** 
(.00017) 
-.00206*** 
(.00067) 
.00064*** 
(.00017) 
.00042 
(.00066) 
Depreciation  -.02584*** 
(.00825) 
.60958*** 
(.02063) 
.01073 
(.00822) 
.53441*** 
(.02070) 
Pay–performance 
sensitivity 
 .95267*** 
(.08076) 
 .00409 
(.08144) 
Book leverage .08817*** 
(.00993) 
 .05475*** 
(.01008) 
 
Salary   -.00672*** 
(.00051) 
 
Tenure   .00255*** 
(.00006) 
 
Age   -.00026*** 
(.00006) 
 
     
Tangibility    .19363*** 
(.00788) 
R2 0.0550 0.0979 0.1627 0.1239 
No. of observations 20423 20423 20423 20423 
Significant at 1% (***), 5% (**), and 10% (*). 
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Table 2.5. Robustness checks 
 Panel A (Volatility) Panel B (2SLS, robust) Panel C (Clustered s.e.) 
 Pay 
performance 
sensitivity 
Market 
leverage 
Pay 
performanc
e sensitivity 
Market 
leverage 
Pay 
Performance 
sensitivity 
Market 
leverage 
Investment .00107*** 
(.00023) 
-.00202*** 
(.00068) 
.00094** 
(.00038) 
-.00143* 
(.00085)    
.00094** 
(.00043) 
-.00143 
(.00100) 
Size -.00997*** 
(.00063) 
.04620*** 
(.00080) 
-.00599*** 
(.00030) 
.04214*** 
(.00100) 
-.00599*** 
(.00084) 
.0421*** 
(.01229) 
Profitability .05112*** 
(.00359) 
-.24709*** 
(.00614) 
.03175*** 
(.00185) 
-.22805*** 
(.00743) 
.03175*** 
(.00905) 
-.2281*** 
(.06318) 
Market-to-
book 
.00233*** 
(.00033) 
-.01903*** 
(.00049) 
.00066** 
(.00027) 
-.01865*** 
(.00286) 
.00066 
(.00041) 
-.0187*** 
(.00332) 
Depreciation  .04135*** 
(.00521) 
-.05583*** 
(.01530) 
.03996*** 
(.00340) 
-.02563** 
(.01203) 
.03996*** 
(.01200) 
-.02563 
(.12981) 
Pay–
performance 
sensitivity 
 .65482*** 
(.06036) 
 .46086*** 
(.06227) 
 .46086 
(.37522) 
Market 
leverage 
.08680*** 
(.01539) 
 .10788*** 
(.02126) 
 .10788 
(.06815) 
 
Volatility -.07872*** 
(.02648) 
.78918*** 
(.06954) 
    
Salary -.00576*** 
(.00048) 
 -.00679*** 
(.00106) 
 -.00679*** 
(.00217) 
 
Tenure .00238*** 
(.00006) 
 .00256*** 
(.00009) 
 .00256*** 
(.00035) 
 
Age -.00010 
(.00007)    
 -.00028*** 
(.00008) 
 -.00028 
(.00024) 
 
     
Tangibility  .11759*** 
(.00583) 
 .12343*** 
(.00738) 
 .1234*** 
(.04458) 
R2 0.1624 0.2830 0.1627 0.2784 0.1627 0.2784 
No. of 
observations 
20398 20398 20467 20424 20467 20424 
Significant at 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*). 
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CHAPTER 3 
FINANCIAL WEAKNESS AND PRODUCT MARKET 
COMPETITION: INTERNAL CAPITAL MARKET EVIDENCE 
 
3.1. Introduction 
Established theoretical literature suggests a possible link between a firm’s financial 
structure and its product market competition. This literature has generated hypotheses which 
predict that a firm’s financial leverage boosts or hurts its product market competition. Recent 
empirical studies attempt to test the predictions, but these studies focus only on standalone firms. 
However, affiliated firms of business groups have one more dimension which represents their 
financial position compared to standalone firms. An affiliated firm is affected by not only own 
financial structure but also financial strength of the business group which the firm belongs to. 
This paper documents the first empirical evidence that financial strength of a business group 
comprises significant product market dimension of affiliated firms in the group. Further, this 
article also suggests the actual channels through which change in financial strength of a group 
affects product market performance of affiliated firms. 
Although the theories on the interaction between financial strength and product market 
competition have received a lot of attention, there are only few empirical works which directly 
test implications of the theories and they often rely on identifying assumptions that may not hold. 
It is mostly due to the fact that financial position and product market performance are 
endogenously determined. As in many cases in corporate finance, it is a challenging task to 
obtain a truly exogenous variation of financial structure that is not associated product market 
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outcomes. It is also difficult to establish whether certain financial structure decision causes the 
manager to choose certain product market strategy, or the relation is reversed. 
This paper proposes that the problem mentioned above is mitigated by using Business 
group data. Business group is defined as a collection of legally independent firms under common 
ownership. Business group is very similar in many perspectives to a diversified conglomerate, 
but different from it in that each constituent firm (division in a diversified conglomerate) is 
legally independent and has equity shares of other constituent firms. I use approach pioneered by 
Lamont (1997) and applied by Lang, Ofek and Stulz (1996). The latter investigates the effect of 
conglomerate leverage on investment of divisions to find evidence of debt overhang since 
investment opportunities of a division should not have much impact on the capital structure of 
the firm. I examine the effect of group leverage on product market performance of an individual 
affiliated firm. Since the group leverage is determined based on the information of all affiliated 
firms in the group, product market strategies of an affiliated firm should not have much influence 
on the financial position of the group as a whole. Thus, group leverage may have exogenous 
variations which are not associated with product market performance of an individual affiliated 
firm. The exogenous variations may also be achieved by studying diversified conglomerates, but 
business groups confer extra benefit in studying the effect of capital structure on product market 
performance. Unlike divisions of a conglomerate, affiliated firms of a business group are legally 
independent. The legally independency makes it possible for an affiliated firm to raise external 
financing on its own and the separate financing generates exogenous changes in group leverage 
which is not necessarily related to other affiliated firms. Moreover, the affiliated firms have 
separate industry codes which are not well assigned to divisions of a conglomerate. This allows 
me to control for industry effects and investigate the product market performance relative to 
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industry rivals. Leverage is largely affected by the industry factor as shown in Frank and Goyal 
(2009). 
The central result of this study is summarized as that affiliated firms lose market share 
when their group is financially weak due to high debt. Specifically, I find economically 
significant negative effect of group leverage on industry adjusted sales growth of affiliated firms. 
The finding is robust to a variety of different ways to calculate group leverage. The findings are 
supportive of the theories that predict that debt leads a firm to choose less aggressive strategies in 
its product market. The group leverage may not provide exogenous variation to core firms if core 
firms mainly determine the debt burden of the internal capital market. Thus, I test the effect of 
group leverage on subsamples of non-core firms in order to avoid possible bias from endogeneity. 
The subsamples exclude core firms and other affiliated firms which are in the same industry as 
the cores. 
While I motivate this study and interpret my empirical findings by appealing to 
established theories on the direct impact of financial strength on product market competition, I 
attempt to detect actual channel though which a change in financial strength of a business group 
may alter product market performance of affiliated firms. First, literature on internal capital 
markets often examines the sensitivity of investment to cash flows of other affiliated firms to 
investigate whether internal capital markets are functioning. Following this approach, I show that 
group leverage has a negative effect on the level of investment of affiliated firms. The result still 
hold for subsamples of non-core affiliated firms discussed above. High group leverage decreases 
internal cash available to affiliated firms and, hence, hurts performance of affiliated firms. 
Second, dividend payments from cross shareholding among affiliated firms can explain the 
negative effect of group leverage. If dividend payments from cross-holdee firms to cross-holder 
firms are important source of cash flow besides from the firms’ own operation, high leverage of 
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cross-holdee firms is bad since debt reduces cash payable as dividends.6 I employ leverage of 
cross-holders and cross-holdees. I show that the only cross-holdee leverage hurts product market 
performance of cross-holders and cross-holders leverage does not have significant effect on 
cross-holdees. Thus, the negative effect is driven by not some other factors which determine 
cross-holding, but dividends. 
This paper makes two main contributions to the literature. First, this study augments to 
empirical literature documenting that debt hurts product market competition, but differentiate 
from the literature by identifying an exogenous change in financial strength from business 
groups. Most of previous studies test industry- or event-specific effect of financial leverage in 
order to avoid endogeneity problem. This paper is similar to Campello (2006) in the sense that it 
investigates the general effect of leverage on product market performance using a broader 
sample. While he provides an instrument for leverage, there still exists a limitation in interpreting 
his results since own leverage is not free from the endogeneity issue.  
Second, by providing the first evidence that financial strength of internal capital markets 
significantly affects product market performance of affiliated firms, this study deepens our 
understanding about the implications of internal capital markets within business groups. Scant 
attention is given to investigating internal capital markets from researchers on Business groups 
and existing studies on internal capital markets mainly focus on the sensitivity of investment to 
cash in internal capital markets. Samphanthara (2006) also studies this sensitivity and further 
shows that group structure and corporate governance have important impacts on efficiency of 
internal capital markets in Thailand. By showing that group leverage has impact on individual 
firm’s performance, this study not only provides evidence on existence of internal capital 
                                                            
6 Gopalan, Nanda and Seru (2008) also argue that dividend payments are used as a channel through which internal f
und is redistributed within a business group. 
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markets, but also suggests that the internal capital markets have tangible impact on actual 
performance of business groups. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The section 2 provides reviews on 
the related literature and develops the empirical strategy. Section 3 describes my empirical 
methodology and discusses the sample used in this study. Section 4 presents empirical findings 
showing that internal capital markets have impact on product market performance of affiliated 
firms. Section 5 concludes. 
 
3.2. Related literature and empirical strategy 
3.2.1 Theoretical considerations 
While there are many theoretical papers on the interaction between financial structure and 
product market competition, such theories are developed at an individual firm level. However, as 
mentioned in the previous section, a business group is a collection of firms under common 
ownership and the group of firms is controlled by a family. The theories can be applied to 
business groups as if a business group is a diversified conglomerate.  
Some theories demonstrate that debt can lead firms to take less aggressive action and 
such theories predict a negative effect of financial leverage on product market competition. This 
idea starts from early study by Telser (1966) and his long purse story. He argues that entrant 
usually comes into the market with vulnerable financial structure and, hence, is easily exposed to 
predation by an incumbent. Similarly, Bolton and Scharfstein (1990) argue that financially 
unconstrained firms may take deliberate actions to increase the likelihood that a financially 
constrained competitor is exposed to financial distress. This predation is possible as firms with 
external financing are likely to be under financial constraint to make promised payments. 
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Chevalier and Scharfstein (1996) also argue that firms with external financing are likely to have 
liquidity problem especially in bad times. Thus, they suggest that firms with more external 
financing are likely to have more counter cyclic markup.  
Like divisions of a diversified conglomerate, affiliated firms of a business group are not 
financial independent from each other. The internal capital market plays a major role in 
allocating resources in a business group.7 A group is financially constrained when the internal 
capital market is heavily levered. Since each affiliated firm relies on the internal capital market 
more or less, competitors may attempt to predate affiliated firms of business groups and the 
affiliated firms behave less aggressively in product markets when the groups’ internal capital 
markets are financially constrained. 
On the other hand, there are other theories which predict positive effect of leverage. 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that equity holders of a firm with debt financing have an 
incentive to shift risk to debt holders since equity holders have limited liability. Brander and 
Lewis (1986) show that the risk shifting incentive of equity holders leads a levered firm to 
behave aggressively in product market via choosing large out quantity. They further argue that 
increasing leverage can have impact on competitor’s decision since increasing leverage can be a 
strategic commitment to be aggressive in product market. Maksimovic (1988) also addresses the 
limited liability effect and argues that high debt can reduce industry profits because it harms 
firms’ ability to collude in a repeated oligopoly setting.  
The limited liability effect can be extended to a business group. As mentioned in previous 
section, a business group refers a collection of firms under common ownership and such business 
group usually controlled by a family. As equity holder of affiliated firms also has limited liability 
                                                            
7 Lee, Park, and Shin (2009) 
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on the firms. Then, the controlling family may want affiliated firms to take aggressive actions in 
their product markets when the group has large debt burden.  
 
3.2.2. Empirical evidence 
Most of empirical studies demonstrate that debt leads firms to behave less aggressively in 
product markets. Opler and Titman (1994) provide an evidence of financial distress cost by 
examining the effect of leverage on performance in depressed industries. They show that in 
industry downturns, firms with high leverage significantly underperform competitors with low 
leverage. Chevalier (1995) suggests LBO makes the product market competition soft in super 
market industry. She shows that LBO announcement induces increase in stock prices of 
competitors of the LBO firm and super market chain is likely to enter or expand in the market 
with high share of LBO super markets. Similarly, Chevalier and Scharfstein (1996) show that 
super market chains which undertake LBO exhibit more counter cyclic markup as an evidence of 
their theory. Phillips (1995) also finds that LBOs are associated with lower output levels and 
higher output prices in three of the four industries he studies. On the other hand, Hadlock and 
Sonti (2009) provide en evidence supporting that debt leads firms to behave more aggressively. 
They identify Asbestos liabilities as an exogenous increase in leverage. 
While the aforementioned studies mainly focus on specific industry or event, the negative 
effect of leverage is also found in broader samples. Campello (2003) extends the result of 
Chevalier and Scharfstein (1996) to different industries and show that industries with high 
average leverage have more counter cyclic markups. He further shows that firm with high 
leverage underperform competitors in the same industry but this is true only for industries with 
high concentration. Campello (2006) shows that debt can both boost and hurt performance. He 
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shows that leverage has positive effect on relative to industry performance at moderate level of 
debt, but it has negative effect at high level. Kovenock and Phillips (1997) report a similar 
finding for the expansion activities of highly levered firms using plant-level data. 
As mentioned above, as an effort to identify exogenous variation of leverage, most of what has 
found is event specific. Few studies examine the general effect of leverage, but they rely on 
identifying assumptions that may not hold. Thus, I attempt to understand general effect of 
leverage using business group leverage. 
 
3.2.3. Business groups and their Internal capital markets 
Studies on business group mainly focus on the effect of ownership structure of a group on 
performance or firm value of affiliated firms. Such studies often presume existence of internal 
capital markets. On the other hand, few directly investigate internal capital markets of business 
groups. They usually examine whether and how much investment of affiliated firms move in 
response to cash flow of all affiliated firms in a group. Samphanthara (2006) sets up a structural 
model of investment with costly external financing and tests empirical prediction from it. He 
shows that investment is less sensitive to own cash flow for business group firms. He further 
shows that this sensitivity to own cash flow decreases as size of central control grows or when 
intermediary exists in a group. In other words, he argues that the sensitivity decreases as the 
efficiency of internal capital market increases. Lee, Park and Shin (2009) report empirical 
evidence on internal capital market of Korean business groups. Specifically, they study how the 
financial crisis in 1997 affects functions of the internal capital market.  
A business group can be financially constrained in terms of internal capital market. If a 
business group is highly levered, it means less resource which can be reallocated to affiliated 
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firms. As suggested in Samphanthara (2006), the more efficient the internal capital market is, the 
more affected an individual affiliated firm is by group cash flow. Even if an affiliated firm can 
raise external financing on its own, external financing is more costly than internal resources. 
Then decrease in internal resources means increased cost to all affiliated firms. Thus, group 
leverage may lead deterioration of product market performance. 
The controlling family achieves control of the constituent firms by a chain of ownership 
relations: the family directly controls a firm, which in turn controls another firm.8 In order to 
keep control of the group in the family, affiliated firms hold shares of each other. For this reason, 
an affiliated firm have significant share of other affiliated firms. Thus, the size of dividends from 
equity ownership is large and the dividends may be one of important sources of cash flows to 
share holding firms. 
While debt burden of a group can directly affect product market performance through 
strategic operating decisions of affiliated firms, internal resource reallocation and cross-
shareholding dividends may be actual channel explaining why financial position of a group 
should affect product market performance of affiliated firms. 
 
3.2.4. Empirical strategy 
As in many cases in corporate finance, when examining the interaction between capital 
structure and product market competition or performance, one encounters problems of 
endogeneity and reverse causality. Since a manager makes a decision on one or the other 
simultaneously after considering many factors including capital structure and performance, it is 
difficult to obtain exogenous variation of leverage which is not associated with performance. 
                                                            
8 Almeida et al. (2009) 
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Moreover, it is hard to determine which causes which to change. Therefore, there have been 
attempts to identify a change in financial strength which is not associated with product market 
performance.  
These problems can be somewhat mitigated by using business group data. Group level 
leverage roughly represents the sum of leverage of all affiliated firms (exact definition is 
discussed in Section 3). The group leverage is determined based on information about product 
markets of all affiliated firms in the group. Also, affiliated firms are legally independent from 
each other and they can raise external financing on their own. Thus, the group leverage can have 
exogenous variation which is not associated with an individual affiliated firm. Moreover, reverse 
causality is easily avoidable since it is less likely that performance of an individual firm, 
especially a non-core firm determines the entire group leverage. 
The approach I use in this study is similar to one pioneered by Lamont (1993) and 
applied by Lang, Ofek and Stulz (1996). Lang, Ofek and Stulz (1996) examine whether the effect 
of leverage on investment is same for core and non-core divisions of a conglomerate in order to 
abandon the alternative explanation that the relation between investment and leverage is due to 
investment opportunity not due to debt overhang. They use leverage of a conglomerate to 
measure ‘exogenous’ leverage which is not associated with individual division’s investment 
opportunities. Like in their paper, I also need to resolve endogeneity and reverse causality in 
order to examine the effect of leverage on performance. To measure ‘exogenous variation’ of 
leverage which is not associated with individual firm performance, I use group leverage instead 
of individual firm’s own leverage. I examine the effect of group leverage on individual affiliated 
firm’s performance. As in Lang, Ofek and Stulz (1996), I could also use diversified 
conglomerate in U.S. to study the interaction between leverage and performance. However, 
business group data provide better experiment than conglomerate as explained as follows. 
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The advantages of business group over conglomerate can be summarized in three ways.  
First, it is hard to obtain detailed accounting and financial information on each division since 
they are not legally separate companies. On the other hand, the data is available for business 
group affiliated firms. Thus, I can include own control variables including own leverage. This 
will provide better understanding of the effect of group leverage on performance. Second, I can 
control industry effect of each firm. Controlling for industry effect is important as shown in 
previous literature (Phillips (1995), Kovenock and Phillips (1997), Campello (2003, 2006)) in 
examining the interplay between capital structure and competitive outcomes. As shown in Frank 
and Goyal (2009), industry mean leverage is one of significant determinants of individual 
leverage and industry average leverage varies in industries. In case of conglomerate data, 
information on each division’s industry is limited, thus it is hard to control for industry effect. 
However, industry effect can be controlled by including own leverage which is adjusted with 
industry mean in the regression. Finally, since in a business group all affiliated firms are legally 
independent to each other, they can raise external financing independently to each other. This 
further assures that group leverage has exogenous variation which is not associated with most of 
affiliated firms. 
 
3.3. Data and Variables  
3.3.1. Data and sample selection 
I use data of Korean business group which is called “Chaebol” for the period of 1998 to 
2006. The Chaebols are regulated by “Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act (hereafter Fair 
Trade Act or FTA)” and the government agency, “Korean Fair Trade Commission (KFTC),” 
oversees the FTA. A legal expression for Chaebol is “Large business group.” A Chaebol in the 
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FTA is defined as a business group where “an identical person de facto controls affiliated firms’ 
businesses.” There are two criteria for a company under a de facto control called “affiliated 
company”: de facto ownership of more than 30 percent excluding preferred shares of a company 
and de facto exercise of controlling influence on a company.  
The ownership data of this study is obtained from Korean Fair Trade Commission 
(KFTC). This data contains stock ownership information for 30 largest business groups from 
1998 to 2001, and the large business groups subject to regulations on cross-shareholding and 
debt guarantees of affiliates of the same group from 2002 to 2006, which are designated by the 
KFTC. The firms in the designated 30 chaebols had been prohibited from cross-shareholdings 
and limited at investing in equity of the domestic firms. Since 1998, just after IMF financial 
crisis, these firms have also been prohibited from cross debt guarantees among affiliated 
companies. These business groups are required to report the status of affiliate shareholders and 
persons with special interest and the financial status of group companies on April 30 of each year, 
following the Fair Trade Act and its enforcement ordinance. Since I focus on Business groups 
which are entirely or partially controlled by a controlling family or a person, my sample excludes 
business groups such as government-controlled business groups. The final sample starts in 1999 
since I use lag variables for regressions. The sample includes 30 groups in 1999, 25 groups in 
2000, 25 groups in 2001, 31 groups in 2002, 35 groups in 2003, 36 groups in 2004, 40 groups in 
2005, and 41 groups in 2006. 
In order to obtain additional financial and accounting information, I also use databases 
developed by Korea Listed Companies Association (KLCA) and Korea Investors Service (KIS). 
These databases contain information on not only listed companies but also private companies. I 
use these databases to obtain information of non-business group firms so that I can adjust all 
variables with industry means.  
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There are several reasons that the business group data from Korea is a good sample for 
this study. First, Korea is an emerging economy in which capital market is not fully developed 
and, hence external financing is costly. Thus, it is a good place to test story on the value of 
internal capital market. Second, business group affiliated firms are very important in Korean 
economy and have businesses in almost every industry. For example, as of 2004, the business 
groups accounted for 14% of the value added of the entire manufacturing sector, 2.95% of the 
nation’s employment, and more than half (52.3%) of the total market value of all listed 
companies (Almeida et al. (2009)). Third, the data is available for both listed and non-listed 
firms. Thus, I can avoid a possible problem arising from sample selection. 
 
3.3.2 Methodology and variable definition 
I study the interaction between leverage and firm performance by examining cross 
sectional data over 8 years. In the sense that this study is not limited to event/industry specific 
tests and focuses on general effect of leverage, it is similar to Campello (2006). The regression 
model I use here resembles Opler and Titman (1994) and Campello (2006), but it differs in that it 
includes not only own leverage but also group leverage which captures exogenous change in 
financial strength of affiliated firms. The following regression equation (1) is a base regression 
equation and I also further include other group variables to control for alternative explanation of 
the group leverage effect. 
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In the estimations performed, all regressors except size are lagged. I correct the 
regression error structure for within-firm residual clustering and heteroskedasticity using Huber-
White’s covariance estimator. I also estimate the model with firm fixed effect model to check 
robustness of the result. In addition to the equation above, I also examine the effect of leverage 
on investment by just replacing sales growth with investment. All financial data are CPI deflated 
based on 2005. 
As shown in the previous literature (i.e., Kovenock and Phillips (1996) and Campello 
(2003)), industry effect plays an important role in investigating the effect of capital structure on 
performance. Thus, I adjust all own variables with corresponding industry means. Adjusting 
sales growth with industry mean provide additional advantage in interpreting result. By 
employing industry adjusted sales growth, I can see how a firm does relative to its industry 
competitors. 
As a gauge of a firm’s product market competition, I choose industry adjusted sales 
growth following Campello (2006). Price setting behavior which has been examined in other 
previous literature does not fully reflect firm’s competitive strategies in product market. Sales 
growth is a nice practical measure of performance which captures the combined effect from both 
pricing and other competitive strategies and it can consistently estimated across industries and 
periods (Campello (2006)). The sales growth is calculated as sales of current year divided by 
sales of previous year. 
As an exogenous proxy for capital structure, I use leverage of a group. Some previous 
literature use long term debt as an attempt to reduce bias from endogeneity. However, I use total 
debt to capture comprehensive financial strength of a group. As mentioned in previous section, 
group leverage mitigates the endogeneity problem coming from using own leverage. Group 
leverage is defined as the ratio of sum of total debt of all affiliated firms to the sum of total assets 
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of them: Group leverage= Σtotal debti/ Σtotal assetsi for all i, i=1, … ,N, where there are N firms 
in a group. Total debt and assets are all measured in book value. Even though group affiliated 
firms are under central control, an affiliated firm can raise external financing for need which is 
not related to other affiliated firms’. Thus, group leverage can have exogenous variation which is 
not associated with most of affiliated firms. Group leverage can also easily avoid reverse 
causality which is an unresolved issue of previous literature on the interplay between capital 
structure and performance in product market. It is less likely that an individual firm determines 
group leverage, but it is more likely that group leverage affects an individual firm’s decisions.  
I use group control variables such as group profit, group investment, group cash, group 
size and number of firms in a group. Group profit is likely to increase resource in the internal 
capital market of a group, hence affect affiliated firm’s performance. Also, group profit is likely 
to be correlated with group leverage. Group profit is defined as the ratio of sum of total operating 
income of all affiliated firms to the sum of total assets of them: Group profit = Σoperating 
incomei/ Σtotal assetsi for all i. Group investment is defined as the ratio of sum of capital 
expenditure to the sum of total assets. Group cash is defined in the same way, but capital 
expenditure is replaced with cash holding. When I calculate the group variables including group 
leverage, I exclude affiliated firms which are in financial sector.  
As an important control, I include own leverage which is the ratio of own total debt to 
own total assets, both measured in book value. By including own leverage, I can capture the 
effect possibly from reverse causality and also industry effect by using industry adjusted own 
leverage. As in Campello (2006), I use other own control variables such as profitability, size and 
investment. Profitability is defined as operating income divided by total assets and investment is 
capital expenditure normalized by total assets. Size is log of total assets.  
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Observations of firms in financial sectors are excluded. Firms which have industry 
adjusted sales growth, main dependent variable, of over 15 or below -15 are also excluded in 
order to avoid possible bias from outliers. The final sample covers 244 firms in 1999, 240 firms 
in 2000, 281 firms in 2001, 331 firms in 2002, 385 firms in 2003, 353 firms in 2004, 488 firms in 
2005, and 512 firms in 2006. Table 1 reports descriptive statistics of variable used in the study 
(both before and after adjusted by industry means), including group variables and Table 2 reports 
correlation matrix. 
 
3.4. Empirical results 
3.4.1 Revisiting previous findings 
Before proceeding to my main tests, I replicate previous empirical studies. I do this 
replication in order to avoid concerns that whatever I show here may be driven by characteristics 
of business groups or Korean market. The replication results suggest that firms in my sample are 
not different from U.S. firms that are studied in the existing literature. I mainly follow Campello 
(2006). My sample includes more industries than Campello’s (2006). The result is also 
reminiscent of Opler and Titman (1994). Leverage is defined in two ways: total debt and long 
term debt. I use total debt in my study, but I also employ long term debt following Campello 
(2006). Campello (2006) not only adjusts for industry mean but also standardizes by standard 
error in order to make “z-leverage.” However, I adjust only for industry mean.  
Replication results are presented in Table 3. Monotonic effect of leverage both in long 
term and total debt is positive. Since I did not standardize leverage, the results do not exactly 
match the one presented by Campello (2006). However, I also find non monotonic relationship 
between leverage and sales performance. I also run similar regressions with total debt and find 
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results reminiscent of Opler and Titman (1994). I find that total debt which is greater than 75 
percentile of the sample has negative effect of industry adjusted sales growth. Since I find similar 
results to findings of some previous literature, the main findings presented below are not 
attributed to some special features of my sample. 
 
3.4.2 Main results 
3.4.2.1 Sales growth 
Now I investigate the interaction between leverage and performance by examining the 
effect of group leverage on sales growth of affiliated firms.  
Table 4 reports a significant negative effect of group leverage on performance of 
affiliated firms. I also run regressions with firm fixed effect and standard errors of regression 
without firm fixed effect are clustered within firm level. Moreover, I control for other group 
factors in order to drop alternative explanation for the relation between group leverage and 
performance. Group controls I use are group profit, group size, group investment and the number 
of constituent firms in a group. After including group profit in the regression model, group 
leverage is still significant. At the same time, group profit is significantly positive. The positive 
coefficient of lagged group profit may provide additional support for internal capital market in a 
business group. Group affiliated firms share profits with other affiliated firms and this shared 
profit increases performance of all affiliated firms. This is consistent with arguments of profit 
sharing in Khanna and Yafeh (2005). I further include other control variables, but they are not 
statistically significant, but group leverage is still significant after controlling for them. Thus, I 
cast doubt on that the effect of group leverage captures the effect from other group variables.  
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Own leverage is most significantly positive, but not significant in models with firm fixed 
effect. The positive coefficient of own leverage may capture reverse causality. It may suggest 
that firms with good performance are able to issue more debt, suggesting larger debt capacity. By 
showing that group leverage and own leverage have opposite signs, one can see that it is difficult 
to interpret the coefficient of own leverage when he/she examines the interaction between 
financial strength and product market competition.   
In all models, the coefficient of group leverage is significantly negative. As group 
leverage increases, sales performance of individual affiliated firm decreases, supporting the debt-
makes-you-weak hypothesis. The coefficients range from about -0.62 to -1.19. When a group 
increases its leverage by 0.1, industry adjusted sales growth of a affiliated firm on average drops 
by 0.062 at least. Again, the sales growth is calculated as sales of current year divided by sales of 
previous year. Thus, drop by 0.062 is economically noticeable.   
Next I run the same regressions on subsamples of noncore firms. Before, I assume that 
group leverage is exogenous enough for all affiliated firms. However, it may not be for a core 
firm in a group. Almeida et al. (2009) suggest that larger, older and public firm is likely to be a 
core/key firm in a group. It means that a controlling family uses the firm to control over other 
affiliated firms. It may mean that the core firm is likely to contribute most to a change in 
financial structure of a group. If it is true, the assumption that group leverage is exogenous to the 
core firm is no longer acceptable. In order to achieve further exogeneity, I exclude core firms out 
of my sample and re-run same regressions on the resulting subsample. 
The results are reported in Table 5. Since as shown in the previous table group controls 
other than group profit do not significantly explain performance of affiliated firms, I only include 
group profit as a control. The core firm is defined as a firm which has biggest value in terms of 
following three variables: size, own leverage and sales. As shown in the table, the group leverage 
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is still significantly negative in all definitions of core and in all model specifications. Moreover, 
the magnitude of the effect is similar to one with the entire sample. Thus, once again I can 
confirm that high group leverage decreases performance of affiliated firms. 
Business groups are much diversified, but it is still true that some affiliated firms are in 
same industries as others. In that case, excluding only core firms is not enough. If some non-core 
firms are in same or related industries with the core firm, their performance may closely move 
with performance of the core firm. Thus, I further refine my sample by excluding firms which 
are in same industries with core firms. The results are reported in Table 6. The result is 
somewhat weakened. The group leverage is no longer significant for models using definition of 
core as a firm with biggest leverage. However, group leverage is still negative for all models, 
suggesting that group leverage has negative effect on performance of affiliated firms.  
In sum, my tests with group leverage show that firms in a business group which is highly 
leveraged underperform those in a group which is lowly leveraged. I obtain significant negative 
effect of group leverage on performance of individual affiliated firms by testing on the 
subsamples of non-core firms as well as on the entire sample. The negative effect of leverage is 
consistent with the prediction generated in the literature such as Bolton and Scharfstein (1990) 
and Chevalier and Scharfstein (1996). I argue that weak financial position of a group leads its 
affiliated firms to take less aggressive strategies and to be exposed to more aggressive 
competition in their product markets.  
 
3.4.2.2. Robustness 
In order to make sure that the results shown in previous sections are not driven by the 
way I calculate the group leverage, I repeat the same tests using different definitions of group 
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leverage. The original group leverage was calculated as the sum of total debt of all affiliated 
firms divided by the sum of their total assets. However, one might argue that total debt should be 
weighted with size. It might be true that leverage of a firm with larger size should have bigger 
impact than leverage of a firm with smaller size. Thus, I calculate the size-weighted group 
leverage. Second, I adopt a different method of summation. Instead of summing total debt then 
dividing by total assets, I first obtain leverage which is individual total debt to total assets ratio 
and then sum them up to calculate the group leverage. In other words, this second group leverage 
is the sum of own leverage of all affiliated firms. The third one is similar to the second one, but 
only it is weighted by size when summing up own leverages. 
The results are reported in Table 7. As shown in the table, the negative effect of group 
leverage is robust to different definitions of group leverage.  
 
3.4.3. Extensions 
So far we find that financial strength of a group directly affects strategic decisions of its 
affiliated firms. In this section, I will discuss actual channel though which changes in financial 
strength of a group may affect performance of affiliated firms. 
 
3.4.3.1. Investment regression 
In this section, I investigate the relation between group leverage and investment of 
affiliated firms in order to examine whether group leverage reduces internal resources which can 
be reallocated to affiliated firms. The regression estimates from the entire sample are reported in 
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Table 8. By including own leverage I obtain cleaner effect from internal capital markets and also 
control for industry effect.  
Group leverage significantly reduces investment of affiliated firms. Increase in group 
leverage by 0.1 reduces investment on average by about 0.004. The notable thing is that own 
leverage is mostly insignificant and the magnitude of the own leverage effect is smaller than the 
one of group leverage. This further emphasizes the importance of internal capital markets to 
group affiliated firms. The group leverage, as in regressions of sales growth, is still significant 
after controlling for other group control variables such as group profit, group investment and 
group cash. The significant coefficients of group profit and group investment are also suggestive 
of existence of internal capital market in a business group. 
As done in previous section, I also conduct same tests on the subsample of noncore firms 
which are in different industries from core firms’. Core firm is defined in the same way as in the 
previous section on sales performance. Table 9 and 10 provide regression estimates for level 
investment and industry adjusted investment respectively. They report that significantly negative 
effect of group leverage still holds for the subsample.  
Significant coefficient of group leverage on investment provides strong support for the 
internal capital market story. If one finds the negative relation between sales performance and 
group leverage, it may be due to factors other than internal capital market. As mentioned in 
Opler and Titman (1994), the industry adjusted sales performance can also be customer driven or 
competitor driven. On the other hand, investment is a direct decision variable of a manager. 
Therefore, by showing that group leverage actually reduces investment of affiliated firms, I 
argue that group leverage reduces internal resources of all affiliated firms. Thus, I conclude that 
group leverage hurts product market performance of affiliated firms by reducing resource of 
internal capital market. 
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3.4.3.2. The effect of cross holding dividends 
In order to uncover another channel of the negative effect of group leverage on 
performance, I test whether leverage of cross-holdees has impact on performance of cross-
holders. As mentioned in Section 2, affiliated firms hold shares of other firms in their group and 
they pay dividends. If dividends are actually important source of cash flows to cross-holders, 
leverage of cross-holdees should have negative effect on performance of cross-holders since debt 
decreases cash payable as dividends. One may argue that the effect of cross holding leverage 
stems from some factors which determine cross-shareholding in the first place, not from dividend 
payments. In order to exclude the alternative explanation, I examine both the effect of cross-
holder leverage on cross-holdee and the effect of cross-holdee leverage on cross-holder. If the 
effect is actually due to the factors which determine cross-shareholding, I should see similar 
effect on both tests.  
The result on the effect of cross-holdee leverage on performance of cross-holders is 
reported in Table 11. The cross-holdee leverage is calculated in two ways: the sum of cross-
holdee total debt divided by the sum of cross-holdee total assets (Crossholdee_leverage) and the 
leverage of maximum cross-holdee (MaxShare_crossholdee_leverage). Consistent with the 
results on the effect of group leverage, leverage of cross-holdee has negative effect on the 
performance of cross-holders. The effect is significant for both definitions of cross-holdee 
leverage and for different model specifications. The magnitude of the effect is on average about -
0.4. When cross-holdees increase leverage by 0.1, sales growth of cross-holders decreases on 
average by 0.04.  
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As shown in Table 12, I find somewhat different result on the effect of cross-holder 
leverage on performance of cross-holdees. The cross-holder leverage is also calculated in the 
same ways as the cross-holdee leverage. Most of estimates are insignificant. The only significant 
one is the coefficient of MaxShare_crossholder_leverage, but it is no longer significant once 
MaxShare_crossholder_profit is included in the regression. I could not find any significant 
estimate of the effect of cross-holder leverage on performance of cross-holdees. Moreoever, in 
contrast to the coefficient of cross-holdee leverage, some coefficients of cross-holder leverage 
are positive. From this table, I exclude alternative explanation for the negative effect of cross-
holdee leverage. If it were due to some factors which determine cross-shareholding, then I should 
have been able to find significant effects of both cross-holder leverage and cross-holdee leverage. 
However, I do not. Thus, I argue the negative effect of cross-holdee leverage on performance of 
cross-holders is not driven by determinants of crossholding, but by resource transfer via dividend 
payments of cross shareholding. This result complements arguments by Gopalan, Nanda and 
Seru (2008) who show that dividend policy within a group is closely linked to investment 
policies in the group. 
 
3.5. Conclusion 
This study provides the first empirical evidence that internal capital markets of business 
groups significantly affect product market competition of affiliated firms. Previous empirical 
studies on the interaction between financial strength and product market performance have long 
been limited since it is difficult to identify exogenous variation in a firm’s financial structure 
which is not associated with product market performance. This study proposes to use business 
group data in order to mitigate the problem. I test on a sample of affiliated firms of Korean 
75 
 
business groups in various industries and document evidence supporting the hypothesis that high 
leverage hurts product market performance. I calculate group leverage to measure the exogenous 
change in financial strength of a group which is not associated with product market opportunities 
of an affiliated firm and examine how group leverage alters sales performance of individual 
affiliated firm. At the same time, by including own leverage as one of regressors, I control for 
industry effect and reverse causality. In order to achieve further exogeneity of the group leverage, 
I conduct subsample tests. The subsample excludes core firms and the affiliated firms which are 
in the same industry as the core firms’. The subsample tests also show that group leverage 
reduces performance of non-core affiliated firms.  
This paper further uncovers what actually drives the effect of financial position of a 
group on performance of affiliated firms. First, I argue that group leverage decreases internal 
resources available for reallocation among affiliated firm by showing that the group leverage 
decreases investment of affiliated firms. The effect on investment is still found on subsamples of 
non-core firms which are in different industries from cores’. Second, I argue that dividend 
payments from cross shareholding among affiliated firms provide another channel. I examine the 
effect of cross-holding leverage. The effect is shown to be from cross-holdee firms to cross-
holder firms, not the other way around. 
This paper suggests that internal capital markets have impact on product market 
performance. This finding points to possible avenues for future research. Previous studies on 
internal capital markets mainly focus on efficient resource allocation in internal capital markets. 
However, we know very little about other dimensions of internal capital markets. One may 
investigate how the internal capital markets affect other important policies of affiliated firms. 
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3.6. Figures and Tables 
Table 3.1. Descriptive statistics of main variables 
  Mean Pct. 25 Median Pct. 75 Std. Dev. 
Sales growth 1.262625 1.002982 1.10661 1.26799 .8158025 
Own leverage .5381033 .400548 .5346506 .6484476 .2618339 
Size 19.18755 17.77365 19.12787 20.57525 1.932374 
Profitability .0627173 .0248248 .0601601 .1029929 .1197134 
Investment .0470543 .0083639 .0275997 .0660516 .0831218 
Cash .065404 .0072921 .0306621 .0816282 .0927153 
Group leverage .4909021 .3863648 .4979585 .5644584 .1541595 
Group profit .0650137 .0426225 .0629543 .0865424 .0400046 
Group investment .038645 .0210817 .0348471 .0500132 .0361303 
Group cash .0345719 .0197591 .0301296 .0457315 .021503 
Num_per_group 21.07728 10 16 33 13.10459 
Group size 23.25135 22.0685 22.88521 24.63711 1.371688 
Adjusted by industry mean 
Sales growth -.5486038 -.4820738 -.1222481 .0290844 2.102606 
Own leverage -.0542158 -.1421443 -.0046099 .1343229 .4613264 
Size .8127923 -.4947758 .7235899 2.135729 1.832762 
Profitability .0241259 -.0213876 .0172161 .072614 .1212175 
Investment -.0023613 -.0354142 -.0107583 .0172935 .0869527 
Cash -.0106825 -.0581475 -.0311789 .0086747 .0857283 
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Table 3.2. Correlation Table 
  Sales 
growtht 
Own 
Leveraget-1 
Profitabilityt-1 Sizet Investmentt-1 
Group 
Leveraget-1 
Group 
Profitt-1 
Group 
investmentt-1 
Sales  
growtht 
1.0000        
Own  
leveraget-1 
0.0507 1.0000       
Profitabilityt-1  -0.0641 -0.1016 1.0000      
Sizet-1 -0.1830 -0.0052 0.0425 1.0000     
Investmentt-1 0.0399 -0.0049 0.0743 -0.0271 1.0000    
Group  
leveraget-1 
-0.0779 0.1099 -0.0849 -0.0197 -0.0762 1.0000   
Group profitt-1  0.0847 -0.1000 0.1746 -0.0035 0.0667 -0.3131 1.0000  
Group  
investmentt-1 
-0.0267 -0.0003 0.0575 0.0086 0.1885 -0.1544 0.1478 1.0000 
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Table 3.3. Revisiting previous findings 
Significant at 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*). 
 
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dependent variable: Industry adjusted sales growtht 
Profitabilityt-1 -1.65878*** 
(.5274912) 
-1.62033*** 
(.4114015) 
-1.49711*** 
(.4029053) 
-1.53727*** 
(.4105043) 
-1.559765*** 
(.4130471) 
Sizet -.143791*** 
(.0285648) 
-.121969*** 
(.0260813) 
-.137280*** 
(.0264528) 
-.130880*** 
(.0258574) 
-.1338036*** 
(.026362) 
Investmentt-1 1.211482** 
(.5498337) 
1.477974*** 
(.4995583) 
1.371284*** 
(.5074734) 
1.336625*** 
(.5126543) 
1.302765** 
(.5139866) 
Casht-1 1.845275*** 
(.6815988) 
1.742616*** 
(.5968495) 
   
Own_leveraget-1 
(total debt) 
.1852912* 
(.1095381) 
    
Own_ltleveraget-1  .2722738** 
(.1080805) 
 
 
  
Own_ltleveraget-1  
(<=25%) 
  .3257843*** 
(.1234647) 
  
Own_ltleveraget-1 
(>=25% & 
<=75%) 
  -1.123618*   
(.6151346) 
  
Own_ltleveraget-1 
(>=75%) 
  .0039271   
(.2552198) 
  
Own_ltleveraget-1 
(<=10%) 
   .3852565*** 
(.1225383) 
 
Own_ltleveraget-1 
(>=10% & 
<=90%) 
   -.5990961* 
(.3379379) 
 
Own_ltleveraget-1 
(>= 90%) 
   -.0392453   
(.2409197) 
 
Own_ltleveraget-1 
(<=5%) 
    .4210685*** 
(.1246846) 
Own_ltleveraget-1 
(>=5% & 
<=95%) 
    -.533137** 
(.2141853) 
Own_ltleveraget-1 
(>=95%) 
    .0345343 
(.2574236) 
GDP Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of 
Observations 
2237 2541 2542 2542 2542 
R-sq 0.0604 0.0552 0.0526 0.0535 0.0549 
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Table 3.4. The effect of group leverage on sales growth of all affiliated firms (group leverage includes all affiliated firms 
including core) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Dependet variable: Industry Adjusted Salesgrowtht 
Profitabilityt-1 -1.3197** 
(.528299) 
-2.5874*** 
(.7090625) 
-1.4206*** 
(.5357772) 
-2.767*** 
(.7128266) 
-1.3259** 
(.5275417) 
-1.3015** 
(.5329285) 
-1.31356** 
(.5299407) 
Sizet -.1753*** 
(.027668) 
-.326955** 
(.1541743) 
-.17643*** 
(.0280024) 
-.32335** 
(.1539836) 
-.17978*** 
(.0286293) 
-.17572*** 
(.0277794) 
-.17068*** 
(.0272735) 
Investmentt-1 .8151932 
(.598638) 
2.02301*** 
(.6758297) 
.776365 
(.5954868) 
2.0286*** 
(.6749605) 
.794997 
(.5966312) 
.9000141*** 
(.5889409) 
.8498855 
(.6016125) 
Own leveraget-1 .3037913** 
(.1211042) 
.1496036 
(.1324972) 
.3097203** 
(.12139) 
.1777042 
(.1329392) 
.3032863** 
(.1213598) 
.3040634** 
(.1211226) 
.2973931** 
(.1192622) 
Group leveraget-1 -.783149** 
(.358078) 
-1.300187* 
(.6808568) 
-.615938* 
(.3649837) 
-1.18889* 
(.6818503) 
-.74220** 
(.3459793) 
-.845237** 
(.38068) 
-.937447** 
(.3664075) 
Group profitt-1   2.466853** 
(1.046376) 
4.13671** 
(1.877703) 
   
Group Sizet     .0249499 
(.0356333) 
  
Group investmentt-1      -1.314707 
(1.457065) 
 
No. of firms in a 
group t-1 
      -.0052506 
(.0035226) 
GDP  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Fixed Effect No Yes No Yes No No No 
No. of Observations 1990 1990 1990 1990 1990 1990 1990 
R-sq 0.0689 . 0.0706 . 0.0691 0.0693 0.0699 
Significant at 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*). 
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Table 3.5. The effect of group leverage on sales growth of all noncore affiliated firms 
 Core firm is defined as the firm 
with biggest size 
Core firm is defined as the firm with 
biggest sales 
 (1) (2) (1) (2) 
Profitabilityt-1 -1.30526** 
(.5353257) 
-1.38374** 
(.5391764) 
-1.342045** 
(.5449746) 
-1.412591** 
(.5499043) 
Sizet -.19705*** 
(.0307989) 
-.19981*** 
(.0312759) 
-.196909*** 
(.031074) 
-.199420*** 
(.0314823) 
Investmentt-1 .7929554 
(.6156651) 
.7607234 
(.612053) 
1.078628** 
(.4873956) 
1.046818** 
(.4834509) 
Own_leveraget-1 .2760726** 
(.1199874) 
.2814832** 
(.1203844) 
.3154243*** 
(.1218744) 
.3192376*** 
(.1220669) 
Group leveraget-1 -.938815** 
(.3835933) 
-.769768** 
(.3894647) 
-.8794142** 
(.3820175) 
-.7287682* 
(.3900522) 
Group profitt-1  2.437499** 
(1.110729) 
 2.128762** 
(1.064672) 
GDP  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of Observations 1794 1794 1797 1797 
R-sq 0.0740 0.0756 0.0773 0.0785 
Significant at 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*). 
 
 
 
 
 
81 
 
Table 3.6. The effect of group leverage on sales growth of noncore firms which are in different industries from the industry of 
core firm 
 Core firm is defined as the firm 
with biggest size 
Core firm is defined as the firm with 
biggest sales 
 (1) (2) (1) (2) 
Profitabilityt-1 -1.6593*** 
(.5937747) 
-1.7102*** 
(.5951995) 
-1.31820** 
(.5282174) 
-1.4192*** 
(.5357759) 
Sizet -.19843*** 
(.0335027) 
-.20018*** 
(.0336577) 
-.17563*** 
(.0276965) 
-.17670*** 
(.0280298) 
Investmentt-1 .2531075 
(.6808965) 
.2365137 
(.6781955) 
.8156095 
(.5986516) 
.7770568 
(.5954751) 
Own_leveraget-1 .3265424*** 
(.121609) 
.3311917*** 
(.1217131) 
.3037163** 
(.1211038) 
.3097274** 
(.1213915) 
Group leveraget-1 -.6266484* 
(.361189) 
-.5009752 
(.3647534) 
-.785901** 
(.3585438) 
-.6171587* 
(.3657745) 
Group profitt-1  1.849641 
(1.145664) 
 2.467877** 
(1.048829) 
GDP  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of Observations 1556 1556 1988 1988 
R-sq 0.0721 0.0731 0.0689 0.0706 
Significant at 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*). 
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Table 3.7. Robustness checks for different definitions of group leverage. 
Dependent Variable: Industry Adjusted Salesgrowtht 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Profitabilityt-1 -1.236166** 
(.5373096) 
-1.319662** 
(.5282989) 
-1.272807** 
(.5301584) 
-2.59478*** 
(.7094564) 
-2.587353*** 
(.7090625) 
-2.55158*** 
(.7094659) 
Sizet -.175851*** 
(.0272641) 
-.175343*** 
(.0276682) 
-.169265*** 
(.0267004) 
-.3322997** 
(.1541958) 
-.3269551** 
(.1541743) 
-.3130306** 
(.1548194) 
Investmentt-1 .9288194 
(.6016878) 
.8151932 
(.5986377) 
.9340069** 
(.6036262) 
2.03337*** 
(.6761379) 
2.023005*** 
(.6758297) 
2.073879*** 
(.6761433) 
Own_leveraget-1 .2933528** 
(.1207685) 
.3037913** 
(.1211042) 
.2792947** 
(.1184695) 
.1623722  
(.1323009) 
.1496036 
(.1324972) 
.1420063 
(.1329534) 
Sw_group leveraget-1 -.0899212** 
(.0446252)   
-.1366604 
(.09454)   
Swa_group leveraget-1  -.7831488** (.358078)   
-1.300188* 
(.6808568)  
Group leverage’t-1   -.0103688 (..0073568)   
-.0252042* 
(.0142925) 
Firm Fixed Effect No No No Yes Yes Yes 
GDP  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of Observations 1990 1958 1990 1990 1990 1990 
R-sq 0.0689 0.0689 0.0677 . . . 
Significant at 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*). 
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Table 3.8. The effect of group leverage on investment of all affiliated firms 
 Investment Industry Adjusted Investment 
 (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) 
Profitabilityt-1 .0696484*** 
(.0245928) 
.0485263 
(.0518623) 
.0504054 
(.051864) 
.0370345 
(.0278516) 
.0709304** 
(.0353072) 
.0661857* 
(.0346806) 
Sizet .0085447 
(.0052387) 
-.003120** 
(.0014489) 
-.0030982** 
(.0014198) 
.0131484** 
(.0063674) 
-.0020004 
(.0013763) 
-.0017203 
(.0013382) 
Salest-1 -8.22e-13  
(1.18e-12) 
5.12e-13  
(7.71e-13) 
5.41e-13 
(8.03e-13) 
-.0000606 
(.0000536) 
3.05e-06  
(3.62e-06) 
-1.28e-06  
(3.73e-06) 
Own 
leveraget-1 
-.039654** 
(.0163621) 
-.0235347 
(.0159084) 
-.0208095 
(.0156126) 
-.0004422 
(.0045614) 
-.0012796 
(.0032964) 
-.0017492 
(.0032157) 
Casht-1 .0436982* 
(.0243176) 
-.0289447 
(.0205422) 
-.0310552 
(.0206147) 
.1354258*** 
(.0308082) 
.0005367 
(.031117) 
-.0026961 
(.0301071) 
Group leveraget-1 -.047278** 
(.0220877) 
-.042642** 
(.0169421) 
-.0365283** 
(.0164359) 
-.0261305 
(.0247786) 
-.058861** 
(.0235121) 
-.0444533** 
(.0222942) 
Group profitt-1 -.0497276 
(.0601897) 
.1594833** 
(.0638807) 
 -.0801554 
(.0692788) 
.0722531 
(.0787761) 
 
Group investmentt-1   .3590622*** 
(.0680111) 
  .3622233*** 
(.0766744) 
Group casht-1   .0065972 
(.0833762) 
  -.0550928 
(.1099844) 
GDP  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Fixed Effect Yes No No Yes No No 
No. of Observations 2003 2003 2003 1753 1753 1753 
R-sq . 0.0343 0.0518 . 0.0260 0.0450 
Significant at 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*). 
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Table 3.9. Investment regression excluding core firm and firms in the same industry as the core 
 Core firm is defined as the firm 
with biggest size 
Core firm is defined as the firm with 
biggest sales 
 (1) (2) (1) (2) 
Profitabilityt-1 .0682022** 
(.0279646) 
.0544763 
(.054487) 
.0674082*** 
(.0244451) 
.0553833 
(.0519444) 
Sizet .0089517 
(.0061624) 
-.00371** 
(.001538) 
.0084841 
(.0052398) 
-.00315** 
(.0014706) 
Own_leveraget-1 -.045573** 
(.0192079) 
-.0144493 
(.017904) 
-.0401122** 
(.0163578) 
-.0225663 
(.0159831) 
Casht-1 .0413822 
(.0279299) 
-.0309893 
(.0217303) 
.0428774* 
(.0243031) 
-.0254412 
(.0208079) 
Salest-1 -8.75e-13 
(1.69e-12) 
-9.39e-13* 
(5.44e-13) 
-8.51e-13 
(1.18e-12) 
6.26e-13 
(8.24e-13) 
Group leveraget-1 -.0468418* 
(.0269082) 
-.0531*** 
(.0184057) 
-.0458029** 
(.0220174) 
-.0549*** 
(.0164604) 
GDP Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Fixed Effect Yes No Yes No 
No. of Observations 1564 1564 2002 2002 
R-sq . .07623 . 0.0293 
Significant at 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*). 
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Table 3.10. Industry Adjusted Investment excluding core and same-industry-firms 
 Core firm is defined as the firm with 
biggest size 
Core firm is defined as the firm with 
biggest sales 
 (1) (2) (1) (2) 
Profitabilityt-1 .0409781 
(.031073) 
.0625635* 
(.0378032) 
.0334716 
(.027692) 
.0741772** 
(.0355148) 
Sizet .0115694 
(.0071235) 
-.00372** 
(.0017845) 
.0129884** 
(.006369) 
-.0019672 
(.0013934) 
Salesgrowtht-1 -.0000615 
(.000057) 
2.94e-06 
(4.08e-06) 
-.0000586 
(.0000536) 
2.82e-06 
(3.71e-06) 
Own_leveraget-1 .0003705 
(.0049497) 
-.0010695 
(.0034149) 
.0000135 
(.0045469) 
-.0014753 
(.0032487) 
Casht-1 .1376989*** 
(.0344974) 
.0034076 
(.0326642) 
.13405*** 
(.030804) 
.0018384 
(.0311231) 
Group leveraget-1 -.0367933 
(.030145) 
-.0715*** 
(.0266059) 
-.025784 
(.0247922) 
-.06403*** 
(.0220157) 
GDP Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Fixed Effect Yes No Yes No 
No. of Observations 1365 1365 1752 1752 
R-sq . 0.0239 . 0.0250 
Significant at 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*). 
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Table 3.11. The effect of crossholdee leverage on crossholder’s sales growth 
Dependent Variable: Sales growtht of Cross-holder firms 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Profitabilityt-1 -1.322739** 
(.6020574) 
-1.330051** 
(.6031176) 
-2.6868*** 
(.8073424) 
-1.32577** 
(.6026421) 
-1.332719** 
(.6037191) 
-2.6629*** 
(.8081278) 
Sizet -.174363*** 
(.0284787) 
-.172700*** 
(.0286381) 
-.43754*** 
(.1676459) 
-.17322*** 
(.0284271) 
-.171785*** 
(.0285967) 
-.43411*** 
(.1678483) 
Investmentt-1 .5945695 
(.739311) 
.6028348 
(.7362205) 
1.929248** 
(.7872449) 
.5983005 
(.739115) 
.6037071 
(.7365557) 
1.888279** 
(.78876) 
Own_leveraget-1 .3048284** 
(.1280203) 
.3046198** 
(.1283529) 
.16963 
(.1466393) 
.3040368** 
(.1282381) 
.3049859** 
(.1283901) 
.1717582 
(.1467704) 
Crossholdee leveraget-1 -.3561693** 
(.1352109) 
-.3218951** 
(.1302748) 
-.465325** 
(.1969261) 
   
Crossholdee profitt-1  .4134074 
(.3391726) 
.4866333 
(.4270326) 
   
MaxShare_crossholdee_leveraget-1    -.34911*** 
(.1336273) 
-.3193289** 
(.1274022) 
-.479853** 
(.193889) 
MaxShare_crossholdee_profitt-1     .3816487 
(.3447408) 
.3536173 
(.4213901) 
Firm Fixed Effect No No Yes No No Yes 
GDP  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of Observations 1769 1769 1769 1765 1765 1765 
R-sq 0.0694 0.0700 . 0.0689 0.0695 . 
Significant at 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*). 
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Table 3.12. The effect of Crossholder leverage on crossholdee’s salesgrowth 
Dependent Variable: Sales growtht of Cross-holdee firms     
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Profitabilityt-1 -1.3174** 
(.5389263) 
-1.3175** 
(.53851) 
-2.73*** 
(.72006) 
-1.324** 
(.54053) 
-1.322** 
(.54033) 
-2.76*** 
(.72031) 
Sizet -.1704*** 
(.02674) 
-.170*** 
(.02674) 
-.3657** 
(.15899) 
-.172*** 
(.02658) 
-.172*** 
(.02661) 
-.3668** 
(.15867) 
Investmentt-1 .916063 
(.60794) 
.917191 
(.60909) 
2.013*** 
(.68398) 
.9217255 
(.60893) 
.9210535 
(.60919) 
1.996*** 
(.68417) 
Own_leveraget-1 .30443** 
(.12130) 
.304239** 
(.1220) 
.1859442 
(.13406) 
.303582** 
(.12146) 
.30399** 
(.12207) 
.1881444 
(.13408) 
Crossholder leveraget-1 .1120488 
(.10754) 
.117511 
(.13389) 
.010866 
(.21343) 
   
Crossholder profitt-1  .0407919 
(.54254) 
-.069564 
(.59472) 
   
MaxShare_crossholder_ 
leveraget-1 
   -.0025*** 
(.00052) 
-.000880 
(.00870) 
.00681 
(.03212) 
MaxShare_crossholder_profitt-1     -.014226 
(.07907) 
-.088647 
(.28642) 
Firm Fixed Effect No No Yes No No Yes 
GDP  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of Observations 1958 1958 1958 1957 1957 1957 
R-sq 0.0664 0.0664 . 0.0671 0.0671 . 
Significant at 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*). 
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CHAPTER 4 
DO BUSINESS GROUPS HELP THEIR AFFILIATED FIRMS TO 
PERFORM BETTER THAN STAND ALONE FIRMS? 
 
4.1. Introduction and Related literature 
A Group of firms under common ownership, so-called Business group is a prevalent form 
of organization around the world, especially in emerging markets. Many empirical studies 
attempt to uncover whether this form of organization provide advantages to firms that are 
affiliated to the business group. A natural approach of these studies is comparing performance of 
the affiliated firms to stand alone firms that are not affiliated to any business group. However, 
most of these studies focus on cross-sectional regressions without consideration of the fact that 
affiliated firms may be different from stand alone firms. In other words, the selection into a 
business groups is often ignored when investigating differences in performance between the two 
groups. Almeida and Wolfenzon (2006) argue that certain type of firms are selected to be set up 
in business groups. Thus, the estimates from the previous studies may be ambiguously capturing 
both the true effect which the studies attempt to find and the selection effect. This study attempt 
to provide more clean evidence about whether and how a business group confer relative 
advantages in performance to its affiliated firms by accounting the difference between the two 
groups.  
This study exploits a unique dataset which contains comprehensive accounting 
information on firms that are acquired by business groups. It is important that we have access to 
accounting data before being acquired by business groups. One can try to account for differences 
between affiliated and stand alone firms without the data and eliminate the differences. However, 
if the affiliated firms might have become different after being affiliated to business groups, 
estimates may be misleading by taking out what shouldn’t have eliminated. That is why we try to 
use the firm that are once stand alone, but later acquired by business groups. Since the acquired 
firms were once stand alone before being acquired by business groups, by taking out the 
differences during the time when the groups are both stand alone, we can obtain clean measure 
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of the business group effect, without any bias coming from distinctive characteristics of group 
affiliated firm. 
The main empirical approach that we employ is matching estimator, which became 
popular recently (See also Villlalonga (2004) and Almeida et al. (2011)). The goal of our 
empirical methodology is to create an experiment-like setting in which being acquired by 
business groups can be seen as a treatment. We try to assure that we are comparing otherwise 
similar firms, with the only salient difference between the affiliated and stand alone firms is that 
the former firms are acquired by business groups. We match these two groups of firms on the 
basis of their profitability, firm size, investment ration, leverage ratio, industry classification, and 
year. There variables are key determinant for a firm to be a target of business group acquisition. 
In order to eliminate potential bias from unobservable firm specific effects, we compare within 
firm changes in performance from the period that precedes the acquisitions to the period that 
follows the acquisitions. 
This study is first in that it controls for the selection into business groups by examining 
before-and-after difference.. Masulis (2009) also attempt to control the selection by estimating 
simultaneous equations of being affiliated to business groups and performance. However, we 
compare firms that are otherwise stand alone firms to actual stand alone firms. Since we try to 
match the two groups of firms as close as possible, the difference in performance that we 
estimate can only be capturing the impact of being in business groups. Thus, we can provide 
cleaner estimate of business group effect.  
Second, this study complements the literature documenting bright sides of business 
groups. There are many studies on business groups, but most of them support negative sides of 
business groups (see Claessens et al. (2002) and Joh (2003)). Many studies showing bright sides 
of business groups often highlight benefits of business groups in overcoming imperfection of 
capital markets, especially in emerging markets. Khanna and Palepu (2000) suggest that group 
reputation substitutes for underdeveloped legal and regulatory mechanisms that leave minority 
investors vulnerable to expropriation risks and information asymmetries. Others such as Hoshi, 
Kashyap, and Scharfstein (1991), Khanna and Yafeh (2005), and Gopalan, Nanda, and Seru 
(2007) focus on risk-sharing and intra-group financial support via internal capital markets that 
enable  group affiliated firms to overcome external capital constraints and the associated risk of 
financial distress. 
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4.2. Data and Variables 
4.2.1. Sample selection 
We use data on Korean large business groups, especially family controlled groups. Such 
family controlled business group is called as Chaebol in Korean. We use the same dataset that is 
used by Almeida et al. (2011). The data are from the Korean Fair Trade Commission (KFTC). 
According to Almeida et al. (2011), the KFTC’s defines a chaebol in two steps. In the first step, 
the KFTC defines the set of firms that belong to a business group. There are two criteria for this. 
The first is based on stock ownership. According to this criterion, a firm belongs to a business 
group if ownership by the controlling shareholder and related persons (relatives and other 
affiliated companies of the same business group) amounts to more than 30 per cent, excluding 
preferred shares. The second criterion is qualitative. Firms are also classified as belonging to a 
business group when the controlling shareholder exercises “controlling influence” over it. The 
latter criterion is further detailed to include cases of exchange of directors and managers, and 
also substantial business transactions between a firm that belongs to the business group and the 
company in question. Because this criterion of controlling influence is interpreted broadly, some 
companies legally belong to a group even though neither the families, nor other affiliated 
companies in the group own shares in those companies. 
In the second step, some business groups are designated as chaebols based on size, which 
is defined as the value of the combined total assets of affiliated companies in the group. From 
1987 to 2001, the KFTC annually designated the 30 largest business groups as chaebols. From 
2002 onwards, the KFTC started using a new category by including any group with total 
combined assets greater than a certain cutoff in their definition of chaebol. Currently, these are 
business groups with combined assets greater than two trillion won.  
Every year, chaebol firms are required to report ownership data in detail. They report the 
status of affiliate shareholders and persons with special interest and the financial status of group 
companies. In a given year, if a new company appears in the ownership data, we track back the 
company in order to find out whether it is acquired or newly established. We exclude firms that 
are set up as new companies in a business groups and include only those that were once stand 
alone, but later are acquired by business groups. The acquired firms are either private or public. 
In case of private companies, accounting data before the acquisition is limited. Firms without 
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information on profitability which is the main performance measure are excluded from the 
sample. Firms missing industry code are also omitted. Finally, we keep only the acquired firms 
that have accounting data for at least two years after the acquisitions and one year before the 
acquisitions. This results in 133 acquired firms and 9547 non acquired firms. 
 
4.2.2. Variables 
To measure performance change of acquired firms, we examine change in profitability. 
Profitability is defined as operating income divided by total assets. As an outcome variable of 
matching estimator, we employ before-and-after differences in profitability. We measure before-
profitability at time t-1 and after-profitability at time t, t+1 and t+2, where t is the year of 
acquisition. These "difference-in-differences" estimates are more like the cross-sectional 
estimates in Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regressions. 
The treatment here is whether a firm becomes affiliated to a business group. When a firm 
is acquired by a business group, it is treated. The treatment indicator, which is denoted by 
Acquired Dummy, is one for firm-years in which a firm is affiliated to a business group, zero for 
firm-years in which a firm is stand alone, not affiliated to a business group. For OLS regressions, 
we measure the treatment indicator in two ways: (1) Acquired Dummy is one for after 
acquisition-years starting at t and (2) Acquired Dummy is one at acquisition-years starting at t+1. 
Usually, one may expect to see the effect of acquisition one year after the actual acquisition, but 
the effect may start to appear from the year of acquisition. Additionally, we can compare the size 
of effect, if any, between t and t+1. If there is a beneficial effect from business group acquisition, 
we may see greater performance increase at t+1 compared to at t. 
Firm characteristics we try to match between treated firms and control firms are: (1) 
Profitability, defined above, (2) Size, defined as log of book value of assets, (3) Investment, 
defined as Capital expenditure scaled by book value of assets and (4) Leverage, defined as book 
value of total debt divided by book value of assets. Additionally, we use log of net sales, Sales, 
in regression analyses. 
 
4.3. Empirical Methodology 
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The research question that we attempt to answer in this article is whether performance of 
acquired firms improves due to being affiliated to a business group. One way to tackle this 
question is to use a parametric regression approach, where the difference between the group of 
interest and another group is captured by a dummy variable. Under this approach, the difference 
is estimated by a coefficient of the dummy, specifically in this paper Acquired Dummy. The 
regression model is specified by a simple and linear representation of a particular theory. Firm 
characteristics may be added as control variables to capture additional source of heterogeneity in 
performance. The coefficient of the dummy in the regression may bring a wrong conclusion 
since the dummy may explain both the selection into business groups and the true effect of being 
affiliated to business groups. Importantly, the inclusion of control variables in the regression per 
se does not address the fact that the two groups being compared may have very different 
characteristics. This can be particularly problematic where there is a poor distributional overlap 
between the two groups. 
The challenge is to gauge performance had they not been acquired by business groups. 
We need to estimate the difference between “counterfactual” outcomes and those that are 
observed. Thus, we employ matching estimators, which more closely resembles an experiment 
than standard regression approaches. For matching estimation, we form a control group based on 
some firm characteristics and compare performance change between the control and the treated 
firms. In other words, we create the counterfactuals that shows how the treated would turn out to 
be if they were not acquired by business groups. The firm characteristics are selected from 
estimating propensity to be acquired. 
We employ the Abadie and Imbens (2002) estimator (full covariate) as our main 
matching estimator. The Abadie-Imbens estimator allows one to match a treated firm with a 
control firm, with matching being made with respect to both categorical and continuous variables. 
The estimator enables us to produce exact matches on categorical variables, but not exact 
matches on continuous variables (though they should be close). Since Abadie and Imbens find in 
their simulations that four matches perform well in terms of mean-squared error, we also choose 
to use four matches. For robustness, we also run not only other matching estimators but also 
standard regression. 
We try to make sure that variables that might influence the selection into treatment and 
observed outcomes are appropriately accounted in the estimation. The treatment is being 
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acquired by business groups. While there is no study that investigates which firm is likely to be 
acquired by business groups, there are few studies that examine what firm characteristics 
attribute a firm to be a target of merger and acquisition (M&A). Although there is no consistent 
factor that determines which firm is likely to be a target in every M&A, firm size, profitability 
and leverage are, not all together, shown to affect the M&A decisions. Specifically, a smaller or 
less profitable or highly levered firm is likely to a target. Since Almeida et al. (2011) show that 
firms with high investment needs are likely to be affiliated to business groups, we also consider 
investment. Thus, our non-categorical (continuous) variables are profitability, size, investment 
and leverage. Additionally, categorical variables are three-digit industry classification code and 
year. Those covariates usually have significant influence over profitability and capture a lot of 
otherwise unobserved firm heterogeneity. By virtue of the full-covariate matching approach, our 
estimations account for all variable interactions. 
Finally, we compare changes in profitability of the treated and control groups after the 
treatment, rather than levels of profitability. In other words, we perform difference-in-differences 
estimations. Although we try to match on profitability prior to the event defining the experiment, 
the profitability levels of the treated and controls could be different prior the event, and continue 
to be different after that event. Also, even if we find perfect matches for treated firms based on 
the firms characteristics that we choose, there may be unobservable firm-specific factors which 
we fail to control. Then, our inferences could be potentially biased by these uncontrolled firm-
specific differences if we simply compare levels of profitability. 
 
4.4. Empirical results 
Table 1 reports results from ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions. It shows that 
performance of acquired firms improves after being acquired by business groups when compared 
to other stand alone firms which are not acquired, after controlling for other firms characteristics 
and industry and year fixed effects. The first column reports estimates where Acquired Dummy 
is 1 for the after acquisition years excluding the year of acquisition (from t+1) and The second 
column reports estimates where Acquired Dummy is 1 for the after acquisition years including 
the acquisition year (from t). Both Panels show that the coefficient of Acquired Dummy is 
significantly positive. It suggests that profitability of acquired firms improves after they are 
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acquired by business groups and the performance increase is significantly larger than the 
counterpart of other stand alone firms which are not acquired by business groups.  
As discussed in the previous section, a dummy regression does not address that acquired 
firms are selected into the treatment, being acquired. We need to discuss about what firm 
characteristics attribute a firm to be a target of business group acquisition. We estimate the 
probability of being acquired by business groups using probit model. The maximum likelihood 
estimates of the probit coefficients are reported in Table 2. Business groups are likely to acquire 
larger, less profitable and investment-intensive firms.  Leverage is not significant in explaining 
the acquisition decision. Additionally, industry and year play an important role in explaining the 
acquisition decision. These variables explaining the probability are used as matching variables.  
Panel A of Tables 3 shows that acquired firms (treated firms) are indeed very different 
from non-acquired firms (non-treated firms), especially in profitability and investment. Treated 
firms are on average less profitable, slightly larger and making a lot more investment than non-
treated firm. It is consistent with what we show in Table 2. If values of matching variables are in 
very different ranges between the two groups, it is impossible to find perfect or even close 
matches. For example, the maximum investment of the treated sample is 1.51, but the 
corresponding maximum of the non-treated sample is 0.79. There is no close match among non-
treated firms for the treated firm with investment of 1.51.Thus, we trimmed both samples of 
treated and non-treated firms in order to make sure that profitability and investment of two 
samples are in similar ranges. In other words, we try to make the minimum and maximum values 
of profitability and investment of two samples similar. This results in 77 treated firms. As 
discussed above, we match four control firms per one treated firm. If two observations are 
equally close to that being matched, both will be used. Thus, the total number of control firms 
will be greater than or equal to the number of treated firms multiplied by 4. Panel B of Table 3 
reports values of matching variables after full-covariate matching. It shows that treated firms 
have similar values of matching variables to control firms. Now, we may assume that the control 
firms may represent the counterfactuals of treated firms, what the treated firms have been if they 
were not acquired by business groups. 
Table 4 shows main results of our study and it reports estimates for whether business 
groups help their affiliated firms to perform better than stand alone firms. Although our estimator 
is Abadie and Imbens’ nearest neighbor matching estimator, we also report estimates from other 
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matching estimators such as propensity score matching estimator and Becker and Ichino’s 
nearest neighbor matching estimator to make sure robustness of our main finding. Finally, for 
comparison, estimates for coefficients of Acquired Dummy from OLS regressions are reported 
as well. The reason the OLS coefficients are different from those reported in Table 1 is that in 
Table 4, Acquired Dummy represents only one year (t+2 or t+1 or t) where as Acquired Dummy 
in Table 1 represents all years after the acquisition. We present three time points: t+2 (two years 
after the acquisition), t+1 (one year after) and t (in the year of acquisition). And the outcome 
variable that we compare between the two groups is not the level of profitability, but the before-
and-after difference in profitability. For example, in the first row, we compare (Profitabilityt+2-
Profitabilityt-1) between the treated and the control. As shown in the last row, the relative 
advantage in profitability of acquired firms is positive, but not significant in the year of 
acquisition. It is plausible that the effect of business groups does not start to appear right after 
being affiliated to the groups. However, the matching estimates are significant for t+1 and t+2 
and the estimates for t+2 are significant for all estimation methods. The size of estimates grows 
as we move from t to t+2 in all columns. As the duration of stay as being affiliated to business 
groups grows, the difference in profitability between the two groups is more pronounced. At t+2, 
two years after the acquisition, the difference in profitability is about 0.06. Considering that the 
average profitability of all firms two years ago is about 0.073, the difference is much 
economically significant as well. The results strongly suggest that business groups are actually 
beneficial to their affiliated firms in making the affiliated firms perform better than stand alone 
firms. Also, the affiliated firms receive more benefit from being affiliated to a business group as 
they stay longer in the group, at least in short term (2 years). 
Taken together, even after we account for the differences between acquired firms and 
non-acquired firms, we can conclude that business groups are actually beneficial to their 
affiliated firms in helping the affiliated firms perform better stand alone firms which are outside 
business groups.  
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4.5. Tables 
Table 4.1. OLS regressions 
t-statistics are in parentheses. The year of acquisition is t. 
Dependent variable: Profitability 
 t+1 t 
Acquired 
Dummy 
.0911709***   
(3.54) 
.0762613***   
(3.45) 
Profitabilityt-1 .5859675***   
(12.72) 
.5857077 ***   
(12.71) 
Log Sales t-1 -.0415695*** 
(-2.82) 
-.0409263*** 
(-2.80) 
size .0572726***   
(2.64) 
.0566703***   
(2.63) 
Investment t-1 .0108127 
(0.15) 
.0097677 
(0.13) 
Leverage t-1 .0169919***   
(3.00) 
.016962*** 
(3.00) 
Year FE Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes 
# of observations 10553 10553 
R-sq 0.1014 0.1011 
Significant at 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*). 
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Table 4.2. Propensity to be acquired (Probit estimation) 
t-statistics are in parentheses. 
Dependent variable: AcquiredDummy 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
size .054677** 
(2.20) 
.0524013* 
(1.91) 
-.0161405 
(-0.49) 
.0526803** 
(1.98) 
.0560832** 
(2.08) 
profitability -.2828711 
(-1.50) 
-.3654828** 
(-2.07) 
-.2206432 
(-1.05) 
-.2431646 
(-1.28) 
-.26819 
(-1.48) 
investment 1.370513*** 
(4.67) 
1.362049*** 
(4.59) 
1.438052** 
(4.81) 
.6257702* 
(1.80) 
1.314911*** 
(4.41) 
leverage -.0164662 
(-0.39) 
-.002225 
(-0.17) 
-.010377 
(-0.31) 
.0030834 
(0.36) 
.0045227 
(0.42) 
constant -3.225654*** 
(-7.19) 
-5.43394*** 
(-9.47) 
-8.44991*** 
(-8.92) 
-5.57487*** 
(-9.24) 
-4.38037*** 
(-7.18) 
GDP  .2613414*** 
(5.46) 
.1946236*** 
(4.81) 
.2531921*** 
(5.28) 
.1896922*** 
(4.49) 
Industry 
average 
profitability 
 4.744113*** 
(3.44) 
   
Industry 
average size 
  .2767787*** 
(4.86) 
  
Industry 
average 
investment 
   8.11882*** 
(7.90) 
 
Industry 
average 
leverage 
    -.6220138* 
(-1.75) 
# of obs 9680 9680 9680 9680  
Pseudo R-sq 0.0173 0.0362 0.0528 0.0755 0.0337 
Significant at 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*). 
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Table 4.3. Characteristics of Treated, Non-treated and Control (quality of matching) 
p-values are reported for differences in mean and median. 
 Profitability Size Investment Leverage 
Panel A: Full samples 
 Treated Non-Treated Treated 
Non-
Treated Treated 
Non-
Treated Treated 
Non-
Treated 
N 133 9547 133 9547 133 9547 133 9547 
Mean .044867 .056462 17.88198 17.59274 .0792961 .0413535 .4851348 .4937061 
Min -.530973 -2.11887 10.89856 10.86123 -.065478 -2.53321 .0010281 .0023311 
Median .032901    .061596   17.9138    17.53656   .0424643   .0182775   .4979138   .4455406   
Max .41195      .767755 23.13601   25.07092   1.510959   .794558    1.224019   90.29751   
p-value 
for mean 0.3689 0.0393** 0.0000*** 0.9278 
p-value 
for 
median 
0.055* 0.055* 0.000*** 0.162 
Panel B: Matched Samples 
 Treated Control Treated Control Treated Control Treated Control 
N 77 512 77 512 77 512 77 512 
Mean .075611 .071552 18.03583 18.27007 .0479376 .0450267 .513384 .433328 
Min -.013612 -.01494 13.2853 13.63843 -.042016 -.010821 .0010281 .010233 
Median .057226 .059896 17.79562 18.09309 .0232088 .0281853 .5385392 .463018 
Max .41195    .379827 23.13601   24.08581   .3361103   .4535057   1.012627   .944900 
p-value 
for mean  0.6234 0.2309 0.6867 0.0015*** 
p-value 
for 
median  
0.819 0.320 0.165 0.216 
Significant at 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*). 
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Table 4.4. Performance change (Average difference between treated and control) 
t-statistics are in parentheses. The year of acquisition is t. 
Dependent variable: Before and after Differences in Profitability 
 Nearest neighbor 
Matching Estimator 
(Abadie and Imbens) 
Propensity score 
matching estimator 
Nearest neibor 
Matching Estimator 
(Becker and Ichino) 
OLS 
(t+2,t-1) .0636777*** 
(5.98) 
.0648206*** 
(3.91) 
0.056*** 
(2.343) 
.1382409** 
(2.05) 
(t+1, t-1) .039836*** 
(3.98) 
.0460288*** 
(2.41) 
0.043 
(1.420) 
.1143412** 
(2.02) 
(t,t-1) .0068496 
(0.46) 
.0082971 
(0.58) 
0.009 
(0.654) 
.0310324** 
(2.06) 
Significant at 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*). 
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